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ASSESSING THE ADVOCACY OF
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING:
A RESPONSE TO PHILIP HARTER
CARY CoGLIANESE*

For many years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have
made enthusiastic claims about how negotiated rulemaking
would "break impasses," "cure malaise," and "bypass lawyers" in
the administrative process. 1 Strikingly, such advocates have ex
pressed little interest over the years in systematically testing their
claims by assessing the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking
against existing rulemaking processes. My research, in contrast,
aims to do just that. Beginning several years ago, I set forth to
test the widely stated claims about the superiority of negotiated
rulemaking for preventing litigation and saving time in the regu
latory process.2 Following exacting and transparent standards of
empirical evaluation, my research demonstrates all too clearly
that negotiated rulemaking has failed to meet these two promi
nent goals. It neither saves time nor reduces litigation.3

* Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government; Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program,
Center for Business and Government; and Affiliated Scholar, Harvard Law
School. The preparation of this response was supported in part by the Savitz
Family Fund for Environment and Natural Resources Policy at the Kennedy
School of Government. I am grateful for research assistance from Curt James
and Matthew Salloway, and for helpful comments from Steven Balla, Derek
Bok, Tom Burke, Jane Fountain, David Hart, David Lazer, and Jennifer Nash,
l See, e.g., LAWRENCE SussKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKIN0 THE
IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987);
Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1
(1982) [hereinafter Harter, Cure for Malaise]; Lawrence Susskind & Laura Van
Dam, Squaring Off at the Table, Not in the Courts, TECH. REv., July 1986, at 36;
William H. Miller, Bypassing the Lawyers: "Regulatory Negotiation" Gets Test
in Agencies, INDUS. WK., June 23, 1986, at 20.
2 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1259 (1997) [hereinafter Cog
lianese, Assessing Consensus]. See also Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Ap
propriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS:
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UN11'ED
STATES AND EUROPE 93 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Coglianese, Is Consensus Appropriate?].
3 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1278-1309.
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In an essay published in the previous issue of this journal,
Philip Harter, a seasoned mediator and longtime advocate of ne
gotiated rulemaking,4 offers a critical response to my research,
asserting that negotiated rulemaking "has been remarkably suc
cessful in fulfilling its promise."5 While it is perhaps predictable
that Harter would continue to advocate for negotiated rulemak
ing, his response to my research fails to meet ordinary. neutral
standards for empirical social science. He repeatedly interprets
data to favor negotiated rulemaking.6 This may well be under
standable as a form of advocacy, but it does not satisfy appropri
ate standards for making sound empirical judgments.7 Harter
makes unfounded assertions about my study, disregards basic
principles of empirical analysis, and continues to advance bold
claims for negotiated rulemaking unsupported by reliable empiri
cal analysis.8 In short, Harter is simply wrong about each of the
4 In 1982, Harter authored a widely-cited article ad\'ocating negotiated
rulemaking. Harter, Cure for l,talaise, supra note 1. This work formed the ba
sis for the Administrative Conference of the United States' recommendation in
favor of negotiated rulemaking. Recommendation 82-4, Procedures for Negoti
ating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 [hereinafter ACUS, Proce
dures for Negotiating], reprinted in ADMlNISTRATlVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNTIEo STATES, NEGOTIATED RuLEMAKING SouRcseooK 11 (David M.
Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1995) [hereinafter ACUS, 1995
SoURCEBooK]. Harter has since served as a convenor and facilitator in numer
ous negotiated rulemakings, authored other articles advocating the process, and
testified before Congress in favor of its expanded use.
5 Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: Tlze Actual Performance of Ne
gotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 32. 33 (2000) [hereinafter Harter,
Assessing the Assessors]. Harter previously published similar criticisms of my
research. Philip Harter, Fear of Commitment: A11 Afjlictio11 of Adolescents, 46
DUKE L.J. 1389, 1421-22 & 1422 n.117 (1997) [hereinafter Harter, Fear of
Commitment].
6 TI1is is, of course, not the first time Harter has presented an unbalanced
account of negotiated rulemaking. In his original 113-page article advocating
negotiated rulemaking in 1982, Harter devoted Jess than two pages to a consid
eration of "possible adverse consequences" of negotiated rulemaking, dis
missing any fears about such potential drawbacks as "exaggerated." Harter,
Cure for Afalaise, supra note 1, at 110-12 {emphasis added).
7 It may also, of course, be understandable as a matter of ordinary psychol
ogy. See RrcHARD N1sBEIT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 192 (1980) (noting the tendency of
individuals to adhere to their beliefs "well beyond the point at which logical and
evidential considerations can sustain them" and to apply "asymmetric critical
standards to supportive and opposing evidence").
8 Each of these problems is discussed in the subsequent Parts of this Arti
cle. To pick one example of the last of these problems, Harter concludes in his
recent article that "[rJeg-neg has proven to be an enormously powerful tool in
addressing highly complex, politicized rules, the \'Cry kind that stall agencies

388

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 9

many criticisms he levels against my research. Not one of his
claims undercuts my original findings in any way.
Although Harter's criticisms are without merit, they deserve
a response for the same reason that negotiated rulemaking and
other administrative innovations need evaluation in the first
place: negotiated rulemaking places significant new demands on
those inside and outside of government and it can present poten
tially significant obstacles to the development of sound public
policy. 9 Before recommending that agencies increase their reli
ance on negotiated rulemaking, it only makes sense to assess
whether this alternative procedure has achieved its goals and
made any demonstrable improvement over existing regulatory
practices. 10 In the absence of careful, systematic research, con
scientious agency officials have no reliable way to evaluate nego
tiation advocates' claims and to determine whether one set of
procedures performs better than the alternatives. 11
when traditional or conventional procedures are used." Harter, Assessing the
Assessors, supra note 5, at 56. As support, Harter simply cites an interview with
another long-standing advocate of negotiated rulemaking. Id. at 56 n.117 (cit

ing interview with Neil Eisner of the Department of 1ransportation). Other
negotiation professionals have rightfully disparaged such use of "advocacy sci
ence," by which those whose interests are affected by scientific research resort
to "smokescreen" and "slash and burn" tactics to challenge the studies they find
adverse and to promote alternative studies that would seem to support their
interests. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SusSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN
ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 812 (1996 ) (discussing "smokescreen" and "slash and burn" public relations
ploys); Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 38 (complaining that "Advocacy
science ... [is] eroding the credibility of all scientific testimony in public
disputes.").
9 See, e.g., Coglianese, Is Consensus Appropriate?, supra note 2, at 106-13;
Michael M cCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmen
tal Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REv. 423, 434 (2000) (arguing that consensus
building "is a cumbersome process that is plagued by disadvantages that out
weigh[] its perceived advantages.").
10 In this way, careful attention to the impact of negotiated rulemaking on
its prominent goals of preventing litigation and saving time in the regulatory
process is consistent with the principles underlying the Government Perform
ance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. & 39 U.S.C.) (promoting agency eval
uation of the results of government programs).
11 As Neil Kerwin has observed, "[t]he purported superiority of consensual
processes over decisionmaking techniques that employ methods outlined in the
APA ... cannot be established by mere positing of generalities and abstrac
tions." Cornelius M. Kerwin, Assessing the Effects of Consensual Processes in
Regulatory Programs: Methodological and Policy Issues, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 401,
409 (1983) .
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This Article proceeds to show why Harter's criticisms miss
their target and fail to weaken my original findings. In Part I, I
provide a summary of my original research and briefly review
some elementary principles of research that apply to any empiri
cal evaluation. Since negotiated rulemaking has long been ad
vertised as a "cure" for regulatory ills, its effectiveness should be
evaluated as neutrally as any potential cure for illness should be
evaluated. The remaining parts of this Article are organized
around the three principal arguments Harter advances. He criti
cizes the way I measure the length of the rulemaking process,
claims that I fail to appreciate differences in litigation, and sug
gests that, in any case, my results do not matter since negotiated
rulemaking achieves demonstrably better rules than existing reg
ulatory practices. In Part II, I reply to Harter's criticisms of my
measure of the duration of negotiated rulemakings, explaining in
particular why it is entirely appropriate to include EPA's
farmworker protection rule in a study of negotiated rulemaking.
In Part III, I show how Harter is similarly mistaken in his criti
cisms of my analysis of negotiated rulemaking and litigation. In
Part IV, I respond to Harter's claim that negotiated rulemaking
has resulted in better rules, explaining why there is no more evi
dence to support this claim than there is to support claims that
negotiated rulemaking would save time and avoid litigation.
The absence of support for Harter's criticisms, like the ab
sence of empirical support for the many years' worth of enthusi
astic claims made for negotiated rulemaking, serves only to
underscore the conclusion of my original research. The promises
made for negotiated rulemaking remain unfulfilled.

Is NEGOTIATED

I
RuLEMAKING A

"CuRE"?

In his original 1982 article on negotiated rulemaking, Philip
Harter advocated negotiated rulemaking as a cure for "[t]he mal
aise of administrative law, which has marched steadily toward re
liance on the judiciary to settle disputes and away from direct
participation of affected parties." 12 He decried the time and ex
pense of administrative rulemaking under conventional proce
dures, observing that:
12

Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 113.
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We have grown accustomed to rulemaking procedures that
take several years to complete at the agency level and, in the
event judicial review is sought, another year or two in the
courts. The cost of participating in such a proceeding for both
the agency and the private parties can be staggeringly high.13

For Harter, negotiated rulemaking provided an alternative that
would "reduce the time and cost of developing regulations." 14
He argued that it offered agencies an antidote to "the traditional
battle" of conventional rulemaking. 15
In negotiated rulemaking, a negotiation process takes place
before an agency issues a proposed regulation. 16 The agency
13 Id. at 21. See also id. at 6 (noting that "the malaise remains-parties com
plain about the time, expense, and legitimacy of the administrative decisions
reached by the hybrid [notice-and-comment rulemaking] process") (footnotes
omitted).
14 Id. at 30.
15 Id. at 112.
16 The process is outlined in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, S
U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. V 2000), which was re-authorized by the Ad
ministrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11, 110
Stat. 3870, 3873-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. III 1997)). Negotiated
rulemaking is sometimes referred to as "regulatory negotiation," or "reg neg"
for short, but the term "regulatory negotiation" actually connotes a broader
range of processes of public participation. Harter disputes this distinction,
which I stipulated in Assessing Consensus, between regulatory negotiation and
negotiated rulemaking. Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note S, at 33 n.1,
citing Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1256 n.6. Harter sug
gests the two terms are synonymous, but in fact they are not. "Negotiated
rulemaking" has a clearly defined meaning under federal law, S U.S.C. § 562,
while the term "regulatory negotiation" does not. In my many conversations
with agency officials and representatives from industry and environmental
groups, I have found the term "regulatory negotiation" used quite loosely to
refer to any number of forums in which agency officials engage members of the
public, not all of which are technically "negotiated rulemakings." This usage
may well stem in part from the fact that "negotiated rulemaking" and "regula
tory negotiation" have long been treated as conceptually distinct, contrary to
Harter's suggestion. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaki11g

Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Admi11istrative
Conference of the United States, 74 GEo. L.J.1625, 1630 n.13 (1986) ("'Regula•

tory negotiation' refers to use of negotiation in any decisionmaking process by
an administrative agency. 'Negotiated rulemaking' is a specific application of
regulatory negotiation, the use of negotiation in the rulemaking process."). In
deed, in his 1982 article on negotiated rulemaking, Harter made a similar dis
tinction between what he called sequential "regulatory negotiation," consisting
of individual meetings between agency staff and interest group representatives,
and the collective, consensus-based negotiations that are characteristic of nego
tiated rulemaking. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 32-33. Harter
again acknowledges, albeit tacitly, a distinction between "regulatory negotia
tion" and "negotiated rulemaking" in his recent article criticizing my research.
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convenes a committee comprised of representatives from regu
lated firms, trade associations, citizen groups, and other affected
organizations, as well as members of the agency staff. 17 The com
mittee meets publicly to negotiate a proposed rule. If the com
mittee reaches consensus, defined as a unanimous concurrence of
all the interests, the agency uses the agreement as a basis for its
proposed rule and then proceeds according to the notice-and
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 18
Harter's 1982 article proved instrumental in garnering sup
port for negotiated rulemaking as an alternative to conventional
rulemaking. The article was based on a report to the Administra
tive Conference of the United States (ACUS), which then
formed the basis for ACUS's recommendation that federal agen
cies pursue negotiated rulemaking.1 9 The initial ACUS recom
mendation noted that under the existing form of notice-and
comment rulemaking, "[l]ong periods of delay result, and partici
pation in rulemaking proceedings can become needlessly expen
sive. "20 ACUS's recommendation was premised on the
expectation that negotiated rulemaking would overcome the de
lays, litigation, and other adverse consequences associated with
conventional rulemaking and would result in rules more accept
able to the interests affected by agency decisions.21
In the years following Harter's article and ACUS's recom
mendation, agencies began to experiment with negotiated
rulemaking and Congress began to consider legislation to pro
vide clear authorization for its use.22 Legislative debate in Con
gress, along with extensive commentary by academics and
practitioners, emphasized that negotiated rulemaking would help
There Harter notes that the Grand Canyon visibility rule promulgated in the
early 1990s resulted from a "negotiation" which, as he and I agree, was not
technically a "negotiated rulemaking." Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra
note 5, at 50. The only way to claim that a regulation resulted from negotiations
that were not part of a negotiated rulemaking is to recognize, as I did in Assess
ing Consensus, that "regulatory negotiation" and "negotiated rulemaking" are
not fully synonymous.
11 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 564-565.
1s For the Negotiated Rulemaking Act's definition of consensus, sec
§ 562(2). For the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures outlined in the
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
19 ACUS, Procedures for Negotiating, supra note 4, at 11.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 For a detailed review of the legislative debate and commentary, see Cog
lianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1263-66.
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reduce the delays and litigation that were thought to dominate
the conventional rulemaking process.23 In the years leading up
to the passage of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,24 regu
latory negotiation was consistently advocated as a means of im
proving what was thought to be a time-consuming, litigation
prone regulatory process.
From 1983, when the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) initiated the first federal negotiated rulemaking,25 to
1996, the year the Negotiated Rulemaking Act was permanently
reauthorized,26 about a dozen federal agencies used the proce
dure to develop and issue at least one rule. All told, federal
agencies had completed thirty-five rules using negotiated
rulemaking, a number that amounted to less than 0.01 % of all
rules issued during the same period.27 As of 1996, EPA had com
pleted twelve negotiated rulemakings,28 more than any other
agency. Interestingly, EPA has not initiated any new negotiated
rulemaking since 1993. The Department of Transportation and
See id. at 1262-71, 1343 app. D.
24 See supra note 16.
25 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED
RuLEMAKING SouRCEBOOK 8 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds.,
1990) [hereinafter ACUS, 1990 SoURCEBOOK].
26 See supra note 16.
27 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1276-77.
28 National Emissions Standards for Coke Oven Batteries, 58 Fed. Reg.
57,898 (Oct. 27, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63); Wood Furniture
Manufacturing Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,930 (Dec. 7, 1995) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63); New Source Performance Standards for Residential
Wood Heaters, 53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R, pt.
60); National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Organic
Chemicals/Control of Volatile Organic Chemical Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed.
Reg. 19,402 (Apr. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (Feb. 16, 1994) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Permit Modifications for Hazardous Waste
Management Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,912 (Sept. 28, 1988) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 124, 264, 265, & 270); Underground Injection of Hazardous Wastes,
53 Fed. Reg. 28,118 (July 26, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144,
146, and 148); Disinfectant Byproducts in Drinking Water Information Collec
tion Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (May 14, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
141); Worker Protection for Agricultural Pesticides, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102 (Aug.
21, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 & 170); Emergency Pesticide
Exemptions, 51 Fed. Reg. 1896 (Jan. 15, 1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
166); Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826 (Oct. 30,
1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763); Nonconformance Penalties for
Heavy-Duty Engines and Heavy-Duty Vehicles Under the Clean Air Act, 50
Fed. Reg. 35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985).
23
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the Department of Education have also been among the most
frequent users of negotiated rulemaking.29
Has the use of negotiated rulemaking "cured" the malaise of
administrative law? To evaluate whether negotiated rulemaking
has had its intended impact, it is helpful to conceive of agencies•
use of negotiated rulemaking as an experiment. This is, after all,
exactly how Harter and officials at ACUS described negotiated
rulemaking when they first recommended its use.30 Of course,
like most procedural and policy innovations, negotiated rulemak
ing has not been employed by agencies in a way that permits re
searchers to evaluate its impact through pure ex-perimental
methods.31 Agencies have not, for instance, selected rules for ne
gotiation randomly from among all of an agency's rules, but in
stead have tended deliberately to select rules for negotiation only
after concluding that the rule stands a reasonable likelihood of
successful negotiation.32 Although a true experimental method
29 The Department of Transportation had promulgated seven negotiated
rules: Flight Tlllle Limitations and Rest Requirements, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,306
(July 18, 1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135); Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Handicap in Air Travel, 55 Fed. Reg. 800S (Mar. 6, 1990) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382); Uniform System for Handicapped Parking, 56
Fed. Reg. 10,328 (Mar. 11, 1991) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 1235); Draw
bridge Operations, Chicago River, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,298 (Oct. 6, 1995} (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 117); Roadway Worker Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,959
(Dec. 16, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 214); Transportation for Individ
uals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 45,584 (Sept. 6, 1991) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 27, 37 & 38); Oil Spill Vessel Response Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 1052
(proposed Jan. 12, 1996) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155). The Department
of Education had promulgated six negotiated rules: Financial Assistance to
Meet Special Educational Needs of Children, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,752 (May 19,
1989) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 75-78, 200 & 204); Helping Disadvan
taged Children Meet High Standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,800 (July 3, 1995) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 203, 205 & 212); State Vocational and Ap
plied Technology Education Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,720 (Aug. 14, 1992) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 400-428); Guaranty Agency Reserve Regulations,
59 Fed. Reg. 60,688 (Nov. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 682); Direct
Student Loan Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,664 (Dec. 1, 1994) (to be codified at
34 C.F.R. pt. 685); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,348
(Apr. 29, 1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 66S, 682, & 690).
30 Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 113; ACUS, Procedures for
Negotiating, supra note 4, at 12.
31 For a discussion of program evaluation research designs, sec LAwRENcE
B. MoHR, IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION (2d ed. 1995).
32 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act requires that, in determining if there is a
need to establish a negotiated rulemaking, agencies consider whether "there is
a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus." 5 U.S.C.
§ 563(a)(4) {1994). The criteria specified in the Act and by negotiation consul
tants for selecting rules for negotiation favor the selection of rules that are more
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is not possible given the nonrandom selection of rules for negoti
ation, careful social science research still aims to adhere to the
basic principles used in an experimental research design as much
as possible. Since negotiated rulemaking is thought to be a treat
ment or a "cure" for the delays and litigation generated by the
normal rulemaking process, the appropriate way to evaluate its
impact is to compare the outcomes of rules that have been
treated with negotiation with the outcomes of a comparison
group of similar rules that have not had the negotiation treat
ment. This comparison group permits researchers to make an in
ference about the counterfactual, or about what w,ould have
occurred in the treatment group absent the application of the ne
gotiation process.
In comparing the outcomes of rules in the treatment group
with rules in the comparison group, social scientists adhere to a
number of exacting standards to ensure that their research results
are sound.33 In assessing the recent claims made by Harter, three
fundamental principles for neutral empirical analysis are impor
tant to keep in mind. First, researchers need to develop and ap
ply clear criteria for determining what constitutes a treatment
and how to measure outcomes. 34 Social scientists call this the
process of "operationalizing" key variables and collecting relia
ble data on them.35 The measurement of a rulemaking's dura
tion, for example, should follow a clear standard. Otherwise,
measurements become difficult, if not impossible, to interpret
and replicate.
Second, researchers should strive to apply the same criteria
and analysis to both the treatment group (negotiated rulemak
ing) and the comparison group (conventional rulemaking). 36
likely to be resolved from the outset. See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus,
supra note 2, at 1317-21.
33 See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: ScIEN1'1FIC
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994); MOHR, supra note 31; DONALD
T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMEN•
TAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION: MBTl-1ODS FOR STUDYING PROGRAMS AND POLICIES (2d ed. 1998).
34 See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 (stressing the importance of
ensuring "that data-collection methods are reliable" so that "applying the same
procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure").
35 See, e.g., JAROL B. MANHEIM & RICHARD C. RICH, EMPIRICAL POLn1.
CAL ANALYSIS: RESEARCH METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 57 (4th ed. 1995).
36 See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 (emphasizing the importance
of consistent data collection efforts to ensure data reliability); Ws1ss, supra
note 33, at 150 (noting the need for careful definition and conceptualization of
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Since the analysis aims to compare the outcomes of both groups.
it is important that analysts try to measure the same outcomes
consistently across both groups. To do otherwise would be like
having election officials in a contested election apply one rule
when interpreting votes on ballots favoring one party and a dif
ferent rule when interpreting votes on ballots favoring the other
party.
Finally, it is essential to include in any impact analysis those
cases where the treatment failed.37 Just as it would be obviously
tautological to conclude that a medicinal cure was effective after
examining only the cases where the medicine appeared to work.
so too would it be mistaken to declare the success of negotiated
rulemaking ,vithout considering the cases where it failed. \Ve can
only know how well a treatment works if we study all the cases in
which it has been applied or tried. In the case of negotiated
rulemaking-just as with medications-the treatment sometimes
fails. Even if a consensus is not reached, the attempted negotia
tion must still be analyzed and included in the treatment group
for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the negotiation
process.
Harter and other advocates of negotiated rulemaking have
not adhered to these rudiments of empirical research and have
written favorably about negotiated rulemaking ,vithout making
careful, explicit comparisons between its outcomes and the out
comes of conventional rulemaking. At the time the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act was re-authorized in 1996,38 the evidentiary ba
sis on which to draw conclusions about the success of the proce
dure was at best extremely thin. Only a few minor efforts existed
that compared the results of negotiated rulemaking directly ,vith
the results of conventional rulemaking.39 In the first such effort,
measures used in empirical evaluation); PETER H. Rossi ET AL., EVALUATION:
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 250 (6th ed. 1999) (ex-plaining that valid measure
ments must be internally consistent).
37 See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33. at 108-109, 129-32 (discussing the
need to ensure variation in the dependent variable); MICHAEL Q. PATTON,
QuALITATIVE EVALUATION AND REsEARCH METHoos 463-64 (2d ed. 1990)
(emphasizing the need to consider "negative cases" in evaluations).
38 See supra note 16.
39 Case studies of negotiated rulemaking did exist. See Coglianese, Assess
ing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1258 n.17. Typically these indMdual case stud
ies assumed that the appropriate comparison group for negotiated rulemaking
was a highly contentious, lengthy regulatory process, but no ex-plicit effort was
made to compare negotiated rulemaking systematically with conventional
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Neil Kerwin and Scott Furlong conducted a study of the duration
of EPA rulemakings in which they briefly mentioned that they
compared the duration of the four negotiated rules in their sam
ple with the duration of the larger sample of 150 of the most
significant EPA rules completed through the conventional
rulemaking process.40 Using dates from EPA's internal regula
tory management system as their basis for operationalizing the
duration of rulemaking, Kerwin and Furlong found that, on aver
age, the four negotiated rules went through the entire rulemak
ing process about eleven months faster than did the average
conventional rule in their sample.41
A second effort to compare the outcomes of negotiated and
conventional rulemakings could be found in the Clinton Admin
istration's National Performance Review (NPR) report "Improv
ing Regulatory Systems."42 The NPR report made brief but
explicit claims comparing EPA's negotiated rules with its conven
tional rules in terms of both time and the incidence of litigation.43
In addition to citing the time savings reported by the Kerwin and
Furlong study, the author of the NPR report stated that at EPA
negotiated rulemakings had shortened the rulemaking process by
up to eighteen months when compared with conventional
rulemaking.44 The report also asserted that negotiated rulemak
ing reduced the litigation rate for EPA rules from around sev
enty-five to eighty percent to twenty percent for negotiated
rules. 45
rulemaking. Kerwin and Langbein set out to compare the views of participants
in negotiated rulemaking with the views of those who filed comments in con
ventional rulemaking, but by 1996 they had only reported results from their
negotiated rulemaking interviews. Cornelius M. Kerwin & Laura I. Langbein,
An Evaluation of Negotiated Rulemaking at the Environmental Protection
Agency: Phase I (1995) (unpublished report prepared for ACUS, on file with
N. Y. U. Environmental Law Journal) [hereinafter Kerwin & Langbein, Phase I].
40 See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An
Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. Pus. AoMIN. REs. & THEORY 113, 122, 124
(1992).
41 Id. at 124, 134 app. A. However, Kerwin and Furlong report that the
median length of negotiated rules was virtually the same as the median length
of the overall set of rules examined. Id. at 134 app. A.
42 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS:
AccoMPANYING REPORT oF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REvmw 29 (Sept.
1993).
43 Id. at 31.
44 Id. at 32-33 n.8.
45 Id. at 32 n.7.
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In my research, I have also taken a comparative approach in
evaluating the impact of negotiated rulemaking on the duration
of rulemaking and the subsequent incidence of litigation. As I
state in Assessing Consensus:
My purpose ... is simply to assess negotiated rulemaking on
its own terms, using the standards that have been set for it by
those legislators, agency officials, practitioners, and scholars
who have advocated its use over the years. The goals of saving
time and reducing litigation are by far the most prominent
ones invoked in the literature and the legislative history.46
My research follows appropriate standards for empirical research
and overcomes major limitations of the two prior efforts to make
comparative assessments of negotiated rulemaking. Unlike Ker
win and Furlong (who, in fairness, never really set out to evalu
ate negotiated rulemaking), I include in my assessment all the
negotiated rulemakings completed by EPA during the study pe
riod. Unlike the NPR report, I rely on primary source data on
the filings of suits challenging EPA rules and thus provide an ac
curate account of litigation filed against both negotiated and con
ventional rules. By carefully applying empirical research
methods, I find that on average it has taken EPA about three
years to develop a rule, regardless of whether the agency used
negotiated rulemaking or conventional rulemaking procedures.47
The median duration is also about the same for negotiated and
conventional rules.48 Negotiated rulemaking does seem to make
a- difference when it comes to litigation-however, the difference
is in the direction opposite to what has been e:\-pected. Negoti
ated rules are challenged fifty percent of the time, while other
comparable, significant EPA rules are challenged only thirty-five
percent of the time.49 These results indicate all too clearly that
negotiated rulemaking has failed to accomplish its goals of
preventing litigation and saving time. Negotiation simply does
not "cure" regulatory malaise.

46

47

Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1259-60 n.21.

Id. at 1283-84. I compared the duration of all of EPA's negotiated

rulemakings with the duration Kerwin and Furlong reported for the rules in
cluded in their study, which were the most significant fifteen percent of all of
EPA's rulemakings (150 rules) issued during their study period. See id. at 1280
n.112, 1313-19.
48 Id. at 1284 n.123.
49 Id. at 1300-1301.
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II
EVALUATING THE DURATION OF
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

Harter disagrees with these findings. He first criticizes how I
evaluate negotiated rulemaking's impact on the duration of the
regulatory process, arguing that I should exclude from my study
one rule that EPA negotiated-the farmworker protection rule
because its committee failed to reach a consensus.50 In a few
other cases, he also questions my reliance on the publication of
the final rule to mark the completion of the rulemaking pro
cess. 51 In total, Harter criticizes my data with respect to the four
EPA negotiated rulemakings that took the agency the longest to
complete. As a result, Harter claims that once his modifications
to the data are made, the average duration of negotiated
rulemakings is shorter than the duration of conventional
rulemakings.52 He is correct that the average duration would de
cline if the longest negotiated rules were to be excluded or their
length were to be truncated. He is wrong, however, to suggest
that such modifications should be made. The farmworker protec
tion rule, while a failure in terms of achieving consensus, still rep
resented an earnest effort by the EPA to negotiate the rule and
merits inclusion in any evaluation of negotiated rulemaking. 53
The other modifications Harter urges fail to adhere to the basic
precepts of consistency and reliability in empirical analysis. 54
Moreover, even if one were to be persuaded by Harter's advo
cacy, his modifications would only affect the average duration of
negotiated rulemaking, and not the more appropriate measures
of rulemaking time.55 The median duration of negotiated
rulemaking remains largely unchanged even after Harter's modi
fications.56 More significantly, whatever one makes of the dura
tion of rules from start to finish, the overall investment of staff
time and effort by agencies and outside organizations remains
indisputably and significantly greater for negotiated rulemaking.
50 Harter, Assessing the
51 Id. at 45-49.
52 Id. at 49.
53 See infra Part II.A.

Assessors, supra note 5, at 41-42.

54 See infra Part II.B.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 126-29 and Part 11.C.
56 See infra tbl.1.
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A. EPA's Negotiated Rulemaking on Farmworker Protection
Harter first seeks to exclude from analysis what he calls the
"peculiar case" of the farmworker protection rulemaking.57 In
1985, EPA initiated a negotiated rulemaking process to establish
a regulation that would reduce the exposure of agricultural work
ers to the spray of pesticides.58 The agency convened a negotia
tion committee comprising representatives from farming
organizations, farmworker unions, agricultural and forest prod
ucts trade associations, state and local governments, the U.S. De
partment of Agriculture, and the EPA.59 The committee met as a
plenary group on several occasions, established a series of five
working groups, and developed and circulated working drafts of
a proposed regulation.60 As the committee neared completion of
a final draft of the proposed rule, the negotiations reached an
impasse,61 and the representatives from the farmworker organi
zations decided to end their involvement with the negotiations.t>2
The EPA attempted to bring the farmworkers' representatives
back into the discussions and continued to meet with the remain
ing members of the committee.63 In the end, however, the
agency was unable to secure a meaningful consensus without the
involvement of the farmworkers' representatives, whom the
agency failed to bring back to the table officially.
Harter claims the farmworker protection rule should be ex
cluded from my analysis of the effectiveness of negotiated
rulemaking.64 He asserts that the farmworker protection negoti
ated rulemaking was "abandoned" by EPA and that the bulk of
the time associated with this regulation should not be attributed
to negotiated rulemaking because it took place after the negotia57 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 41.
58 See Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed
Farmworker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 50 Fed. Reg.
38,030 (Sept. 19, 1985).
59 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed. Reg.
25,970, 25,972 (proposed July 8, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156 &
170).
60 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed. Reg.
at 25,972-25,973.
61 See SussKIND & FIELD, supra note 8, at 35.
62 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed. Reg.
at 25,973.
63 See, e.g., Worker Protection Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,973; Susskind &
Van Dam, supra note 1, at 44. See also SussKINo & FIELD, supra note 8, at 35.
64 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 42.
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tions collapsed. 65 Yet what happened in the farmworker protec
tion rulemaking could happen in any negotiated rulemaking.
Negotiation does not always yield a consensus, and the mere fact
that consensus is not reached is no reason to exclude from evalu
ation those rules for which the agency otherwise earnestly tried
to use negotiation.
If we are to determine whether negotiated rulemaking is ef
fective in achieving its goals, both common sense and conven
tional empirical research methods dictate that we look at all the
cases where the technique was used, not only those cases where it
succeeds. Although negotiated rulemakings should be excluded
when they were genuinely abandoned, I specifically state in As
sessing Consensus that by "abandoned" negotiated rulemakings
"I do not mean that the participants failed to reach consensus." 66
Rather, in a passage that Harter quotes,67 I treat as "abandoned"
those rulemakings for which the agency, at some point after pub
lication of an intent to negotiate, either (1) "decided not to com
mence negotiations," (2) "disbanded the committee before
seeking even a limited agreement," or (3) "withdrew the underly
ing regulatory action altogether." 68 Rulemakings that meet any
one of these three criteria are rulemakings for which the agency
failed to use the negotiation process earnestly as a means of de
veloping a rule, or for which the agency declared its decision to
issue no rule at all. 69 They are cases where the agency essentially
decided to forego altogether the experimental treatment called
negotiated rulemaking.
The EPA did commence and earnestly pursue negotiations
in the farmworker protection rule. The agency worked diligently
and responsibly to seek an agreement in this case, and apparently
even came close to doing so.70 When problems arose, the agency
65 Id.

66 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1277 n.98.
67 Harter quotes my full definition of "abandoned" negotiated rulemakings.
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, s11pra note 5, at 39 n.30.
68 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1274 n.98, 1274 tbl.1.
69 As I have noted before, the fact that agencies have decided to abandon
certain rules without earnestly seeking agreement shows that rules are not se
lected for negotiation randomly. In fact, the selection criteria used by agencies
to choose rules for negotiation-and then to pursue those negotiations ear
nestly-favor precisely those rules that are more likely to succeed in the first
place. See id. at 1312.
70 Susskind and Field write that the farmworkers withdrew from the com
mittee "[a]s the final draft approached completion." SussKIND & FIELD, s11pra
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and the other parties offered to replace the facilitator in an effort
to keep the farmworkers' representatives on the committee.71
The EPA continued to hold meetings with the rest of the commit
tee, "hoping that the farmworkers' representatives would re
turn."72 In addition, the EPA reportedly continued to share
drafts of the proposed rule with the farmworkers' representatives
before the opening of the notice-and-comment period.73 EPA
did not "abandon" the farmworker protection negotiated
rulemaking; rather, one non-governmental interest abandoned
the negotiation committee-the committee simply failed to reach
a consensus.74
EPA did eventually issue a final farmworker protection rule,
and in doing so the agency made a point of crediting the negotia
tion process for having "helped shape the proposed regula
tion."75 Harter himself suggests that the agency learned much
from the negotiation process and that the discussion draft that
emerged from the negotiations formed a basis for its final rule.76
In making this suggestion, however, Harter essentially concedes
that the farmworker protection rule was, after all, a negotiated
rulemaking. One cannot consistently treat the rule as a negoti
ated rulemaking in order to claim credit for some benefits, only
note 8, at 35. For further discussion of the extensive negotiations that took
place, see Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed.
Reg. 25,970, 25,973 (proposed July 8, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 156
& 170).
71 Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 44. Harter was the facilitator of
this negotiated rulemaking. See 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 388.
72 Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 44.
73 Id.
74 In a Federal Register notice published the following year, EPA described
the farmworker protection rulemaking as one of the agency's "successfully con
ducted" negotiations. Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate
Regulations Governing Major and Minor Modifications of Resource, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,739, 25,740 (July 16, 1986). As stated in this same notice, "EPA en
couraged the [farmworker] group to return, and kept all Committee members
fully informed to all developments. The remainder of the committee continued
to meet, with some in the absent interest group participating informally. The
draft rule produced, while not a consensus package, attempts to balance the
concerns of all parties." Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate
Regulations Governing Major and Minor Modifications of Resource, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 25,740.
75 Worker Protection Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,973.
76 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 42 n.47 (citing EPA Pesti
cide Division staff members as claiming that "the agency learned a huge
amount" from the negotiations and "based significant administrative action on
that insight").

402

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 9

to exclude it when it comes to assessing whether negotiated
rulemaking achieves other benefits.
Significantly, no one ever claimed that the farmworker pro
tection rule should be treated as anything but a completed nego
tiated rulemaking until after my research results were published.
Lee Thomas, who served as the EPA Administrator during the
negotiations and through the publication of the proposed rule,
counted the farmworker protection rule among EPA's negotiated
rules.77 When the EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evalua
tion set out to assess how well negotiated rulemaking worked, it
included the farmworker protection rule in its study. 78 Indeed,
on eight separate occasions, the EPA listed the farmworker pro
tection rule as an example of one of its negotiated rulemaking in
the Federal Register.79 The rule has appeared in three separate
77 Lee M. Thomas, The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation by EPA,
AoMIN. L. NEws, Fall 1987, at 1, 3. In a speech given in 1986, Thomas referred
to the farmworker protection rule as one of EPA's "completed" negotiated
rulemakings, not as a rulemaking the agency had abandoned:
Recently, we completed our third negotiated rulemaking. This one,
dealing with farmworker protection, proved something we knew all along.
Negotiations are not easy, and they will not always proceed without
trouble....
While the farmworker protection standards negotiation started out
with promise, one of the major participants elected to leave the advisory
committee before a final package was agreed upon. This is permissible
under terms of the negotiation process. While it created a problem for
those remaining in the rulemaking exercise, the interest group continued
to participate informally. The committee kept the group fully informed of
all developments, and provided drafts of the regulatory package as it
emerged....
Lee M. Thomas, Remarks at the Third National Conference on Dispute Reso
lution 9 (May 29, 1986) (transcript on file with author).
78 See PROGRAM EVALUATION Div., EPA, AN AssessMENT OF EPA's Ne.
GOTIATED RuLEMAKING Acr1vmES (1987), reprinted in ACUS, 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 23, 25.
79 Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed Regula
tion for Architectural and Industrial Maintenance Coatings Under Section
1873(e) of Clean Air Act as Amended and Announcement of Public Meeting,
57 Fed. Reg. 31,473 (July 16, 1992); Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to
Negotiate Guidelines and Proposed Regulations Implementing Clean Fuels
Provisions and Announcement of Public Meeting, 56 Fed. Reg. 5167 (Feb. 8,
1991); Underground Injection Control, Class II Wells: Intent to Form an Advi
sory Committee to Negotiate Amendments to Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 4957
(Feb. 7, 1991); NOx Emission Reduction Provisions and Announcement of Pub•
lic Meeting, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,348 (May 8, 1991); Intent to Form an Advisory
Committee to Negotiate Recycling of Lead Acid Batteries & Announcement of
Organizational Meeting, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,884 (Dec. 24, 1990); Candidates for
Regulatory Negotiation, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,003 (Dec. 19, 1988); Consideration of
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reports issued by ACUS, again listed as one of EPA's negotiated
rulemakings.80 EPA's Consensus and Dispute Resolution Pro
gram has kept its own internal list of EPA negotiated rulemak
ings, on which the farmworker protection rule can be found.81
Fmally, the director of the Consensus and Dispute Resolution
Program, Chris Kirtz, published an article listing the farmworker
protection rule as one of EPA's negotiated rulemakings.�
Interestingly, EPA's internal list of negotiated rulemakings
was recently modified to add a sentence to the description of the
farmworker protection rulemaking stating that the "negotiation
was abandoned."83 This statement never appeared in three ear
lier versions of this EPA list of negotiated rulemakings,84 making
it reasonable to wonder why EPA staff would change its descrip
tion in this document more than five years after EPA issued its
final rule and more than ten years after the farmworkers recon
sidered their involvement in the negotiations. Perhaps part of
Establishing an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed Regulations Im
plementing the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 52 Fed.
Reg. 1377 (Jan. 13, 1987); Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate
Regulations Governing Major and Minor Modifications of Resource, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,739 (July 16, 1986).
so ACUS, 1990 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 25, 331-32; ACUS, 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 388; Am,fINISTRATlVE CONFERENCE OF TI-IE
UNITED STATES, BUILDING CoNSENSUS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING: IMPI.E."1E."-T·
ING TIIE NEGOTIATED RuLEMAKING Acr 56 (1995) [hereinafter ACUS, BUILD
ING CoNSENSUS].
Sl EPA, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT TI-IE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIOX
AGENCY 4 (Mar. 1992) (on file with the author); EPA, NEGOTIATED RULE..\IAK•
ING ATTIIE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 5 (Oct. 1992} (on file \\ith
the author); EPA, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRO
TECTION AGENCY 6 (Nov. 18, 1994) (on file with the author). There is one
negotiated.rulemaking-on lead acid battery recycling-that was included on
these lists but which I treated as "abandoned.'' That is because it truly was.
The EPA decided, based on its risk and cost analysis, not to issue any rule at all
on lead acid battery recycling. See id. at 4-5 (noting that EPA adjourned the
committee "after reviewing the risk and cost information [and concluding] that
the risk/benefits did not adequately balance the cost of regulating"); Lead-Acid
Battery Committee Disbanded by EPA After Mo11ths of Regulatory Talks. 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1339 (Sept. 20, 1991) (noting that EPA terminated
the entire rulemaking after "two reports showed that the costs associated \\ith
increasing lead acid battery recycling were not justified by the small reduction
in risk").
82 Chris Kirtz, Regulatory Negotiation: The New n't1y to De1·elop Regula
tions? 1 J. ENVTL. PERMITTING 269, 277 (1992).
83 EPA, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTJOX
AGENCY 6 (Jan. 2, 1998) (emphasis added) (on file with the author).
84 See supra note 81.
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the explanation lies in the fact that EPA made a point to dis
tribute copies of its altered list at the 1998 Association of Ameri
can Law Schools panel organized around my research.85 When
the farmworker protection proceeding was described earlier by
the agency in the Federal Register, EPA never described the ne
gotiated rulemaking as having been "abandoned" (the same
word used to label the category of rules excluded from my
study). Rather, EPA noted that representatives from four groups
"decided to discontinue participation in the Regulatory Negotia
tion process" and that afterwards the agency still scheduled four
additional meetings with the remaining members of the negotia
tion committee. s6
Notwithstanding Harter's and EPA's efforts to revise the
historical record, the farmworker protection rule is properly con
sidered one of the agency's negotiated rules. Administrative law
scholars have considered it as such. 87 Moreover, Laura Langbein
and Neil Kerwin, whose research Harter considers "rigorous"
and "the only careful and comprehensive" empirical research on
negotiated rulemaking,88 initially included the farmworker pro
tection rule in their study. 89 They eventually dropped it from
their sample of negotiated rules, but not because of any princiss Chaired by Peter Schuck of Yale Law School, the panel included Philip
Harter, Jody Freeman of UCLA, Thomas Kelly, of EPA's Regulatory Manage
ment and Information Office, and myself. Kelly has also subsequently criticized
my research in terms similar to Harter's. For an exchange with Kelly, sec
Thomas E. Kelly, Letters, Questionable Conclusions, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Oct.
1998, available at 1998 WL 10315070; Cary Coglianese, Letters, More on Nego
tiated Rulemaking, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1999, at 88, available at 1999 WL
11998419.
86 See Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 53 Fed, Reg,
25,970, 25,973 (proposed July 8, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pis. 156 &
170). See also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. Under the operating
protocol for this negotiated rulemaking, the committee members were permit
ted to discontinue negotiations at any time. See Philip J. Harter, The Role of
Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 CoLUM, J.
ENVTL. L. 51, 72 (1986) (reprinting the operating protocol for the farmworker
protection negotiated rulemaking).
87 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees,
Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. Cm. LEGAL, F.,
327, 330 n.10; Perritt, supra note 16, at 1686-87; Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons
from a Public Policy Failure: EPA and Noise Abatement, 19 EcoLOOY L.Q. 1,
56 (1992).
88 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55-56.
89 Langbein & Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation versus Conventional Rule
Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. Pun. ADMJN.
RES. & THEORY 599, 600 (2000).

2001]

ASSESSING THE ADVOCACY OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

405

pled or methodological reason for excluding it from a study of
the performance of negotiated rulemaking. Rather, Langbein
and Kerwin dropped it simply because they were unable to locate
enough of the participants in the rulemaking to interview.9 Fur
thermore, Harter has himself acknowledged that the farmworker
protection rulemaking was a negotiated rulemaking, going so far
as to reprint the organizational protocol for the negotiations as
an appendix to an earlier article.91
It is understandable why an advocate would now like to
treat the farmworker protection rulemaking as if it were not a
negotiated rulemaking for the purpose of determining the aver
age duration of negotiated rules. The farmworker protection
rule took longer to complete than any other.92 As Harter points
out, removing this one rule from the group of EPA negotiated
rulemakings has the effect of decreasing the average duration of
these rules by approximately four months. 93 Yet Harter fails to
note that in using Federal Register notices to compute the dura
tion of negotiated rulemakings, I actually understate the average
duration by about the same amount of time. As I note in Assess
ing Consensus, "Federal Register listings yield an average time
for the four negotiated rules in the Kenvin and Furlong study of
1.8 years (647 days), more than four months shorter than the av
erage they report for the same rules [778 days]." 94 My approach
therefore underestimates rulemaking duration because it ex
cluded the agency work that precedes the publication of a notice
of intent and which leads the agency to make the decision to en-

°

90 See id. (stating that "[w]e had to drop one negotiated rule because we
could not locate enough respondents (Farmworker Protection Standards)");
Kerwin & Langbein, Phase I, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that "the location
efforts were so unsuccessful that the reg neg-farmworker protection-was
dropped from the original list of nine, reducing it to the current eight").
91 Harter, supra note 86, at 60, 70-72 app.
92 In his critique, Harter states that "if one wants to make much of 'average'
tinte for development, the aberrant nature of [the farmworker protection] case
should be noted." Harter, Assessing tlze Assessors, supra note 5, at 42. If by
this Harter means to suggest that I do not reveal the duration of this rule, he is
again mistaken. I distinctly note in Assessilzg Co11se11sus that the farmworker
protection rule was the negotiated rulemaking of longest duration. Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1279.
93 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 42. Harter does not indi
cate that even by excluding this rule the median duration of EPA's negotiated
rules decreases by only less than a month: from 777 days to 749 days. For a
discussion of the median as a measure of central tendency, see infra text accom
panying note 129.
94 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1282-83.
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gage in a negotiated rulemaking. In this and other ways, my ap
proach relies on conservative measures that in effect create a
"deliberate bias in favor of finding a time savings in rules devel
oped with negotiated rulemaking procedures." 95 As a result,
even supposing the farmworker protection rule should be ex
cluded as a negotiated rulemaking, the resulting average time de
crease caused by excluding it is still within the bounds of what
can be explained by the conservative measure I used for the du
ration of negotiated rulemaking. 96 It is simply not possible to
conclude with any confidence that negotiated rulemaking has
made the rulemaking process significantly shorter.
B. Calculating Rulemaking Duration
Harter critiques my analysis of rulemaking duration in other
ways. He claims, for example, that by using a "strictly numerical
methodology" for evaluating the duration of rulemaking I have
ignored "the varying complexity of rules." 97 He notes that
"[r]ulemaking is an inherently political activity" and argues that
"counting days between two events disregards all the dynamics of
political activity." 98 Although Harter never clearly states what
inference he thinks should be drawn from these vague points, he
appears to be suggesting either (1) that negotiated rulemaking
should not be subject to empirical evaluation99 or (2) that omit
ted, perhaps even unmeasurable, variables influence the duration
of the rulemaking process, making quantitative analysis unrelia
ble. There is no reason to support the first claim that negotiated
rulemaking should be exempt from the kind of evaluation to
95 Id. at 1283-84 n.120 (emphasis added).
96 Moreover, if the farmworker protection rule were removed from the set
of negotiated rules, this would only serve to increase the overall litigation rate
for negotiated rulemakings to fifty-five percent, since the farmworker protec
tion rule was never subjected to a petition for judicial review. Of course, EPA
did negotiate the farmworker protection rule, as the agency earnestly sought to
obtain an agreement.
97 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 45.
98 Id.
99 Cf. Harter, Fear of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1421 (noting his "skepti
cism over evaluations"). Interestingly, Harter's purported skepticism of evalua
tions is selective. He draws no issue with the methodology of the Kerwin and
Furlong study, supra note 40, which also counted days, nor with that of the
Langbein and Kerwin study, supra note 89, which also employed a "numerical
methodology" but which Harter considers "enormously helpful," Harter, Fear
of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1421.
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which other policies or procedures are normally subjected. 100
Even advocates of negotiated rulemaking recognize that it
should be subject to evaluation.101
The second claim raises a concern that should be considered
for all empirical research, but it matters only if there is reason to
suspect that omitted variables are relevant and systematically bi
asing the results in one direction. 102 Harter offers no credible
reason to suspect that the so-called "dynamics" inherent to all
rulemaking systematically operate to lengthen the time it would
otherwise take to complete the rulemakings that were negoti
ated, nor does he specify any particular variable that should have
been included in my analysis. In contrast. I extensively scrutinize
the possibility of omitted variable bias in Assessing Corzsensus. 103
All the available evidence indicates that the rules selected for
negotiation tend to involve underlying issues and interests that
made them more-not less-likely to succeed in achieving a
timely outcome. 104 EPA has not used negotiated rulemaking for
100 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also ACUS, Procedures for
Negotiating, supra note 4, at 11 (noting that negotiated rulemaking "should be
reviewed after it has been used a reasonable number of times").
101 See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 142 (1985) (noting that the
benefits of negotiated rulemaking must be demonstrated). See generally Ker
win, supra note 11.
102 See, e.g., King et al., supra note 33, at 169 (noting that "we can safely omit
control variables, even if they have a strong influence on the dependent ,·aria
ble, as long as they do not vary with the included ex-planatory \'ariable").
103 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1313-17. King, Keo
hane, and Verba "advise that all researchers, quantjtative and qualitative, sys
tematically look for omitted control variables and consider whether they should
be included in the analysis." KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 172. For precisely
this reason, I specifically examined the possibility that the economic impact of
the rule (that is, those rules classified as major rules under Executive Orders
12291 and 12866) would affect the analysis, since so-called major rules do tend
to take a longer tinie to develop and are more prone to litigation. I concluded
that this variable does not account for my findings since "EPA has not negoti
ated a disproportionate number of major rules." Coglianese, Assessing Consen
sus, supra note 2, at 1313 n.259, 1316. Furthermore, although the number of
cases is small, EPA's major negotiated rules took longer to develop than did
other EPA major rules and were still challenged at a higher rate than were its
major rules overall. Id.
104 Harter asserts that the rules selected for negotiated rulemaking have in
volved "particularly difficult, contentious issues that ha\'e eluded closure by
means of traditional rulemaking procedures." Harter, Assessing the Assessors,
supra note 5, at 38-39. In contrast, EPA itself has acknowledged that negotiated
rulemaking has been selected for "second-tier" rules which address "program
implementation-rather than rules establishing program structure." Program
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the rules affecting the broadest number of organizations nor for
those rules raising the most contentious policy issues. Rather,
the agency has tended to follow the advice of negotiation consul
tants, as well as the guidelines of the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act, to select rules for negotiation for which the agency deter
mines there is a preexisting likelihood of success within a limited
amount of time. 105 Admittedly, on some occasions the agency
has selected significant rulemakings to negotiate and, as we
know, it has also sometimes misjudged whether a consensus
could be attained in a fixed time period. 106 Overall, though, the
agency has tended to select rules that are expected to take less
time to promulgate. 107
Harter also claims that instead of using a consistent, verifia
ble method of calculating rulemaking duration, I should have im
puted different ending points to negotiated rules based on "the
actual, immediate goal the agency hoped to accomplish" and
"what those who would be affected by the agency's action
thought." 108 Harter asserts that because I used the date when
the agency published its final rule, rather than imputing ending
Evaluation Division, supra note 78, at 23, 34. EPA's statement of selection cri
teria for negotiated rulemaking begins by noting that "[i]t is important to screen
potential rulemakings to identify instances where negotiation of the rule has a
high probability of successful use." EPA REGULATORY NEGOTIAT10N CANDI•
DATE SELECTION CRITERIA, reprinted in ACUS, 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note
4, at 42, 42. See also EPA Regulatory Negotiation Project, 48 Fed. Reg. 7494,
7495 (Feb. 22, 1983) (noting that "it is important to screen potential rulemak
ings to identify where this approach has a high probability of success"). In As
sessing Consensus, I extensively considered the possibility that the rules EPA
selected for negotiation were more difficult or contentious at the outset. Cog
lianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1311-21. My review indicated
that while EPA's negotiated rules were generally not trivial ones, neither were
they the most significant or conflict-ridden rules promulgated by the agency•.
Id. at 1318-19.
ios For examples of selection guidelines, see Coglianese, Assessing Consen
sus, supra note 2, at 1319-20.
106 See supra Part II.A.
101 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1317-21. See also
Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rulemaking and the Time It
Takes to Develop Rules 25 (1999) (unpublished paper presented at the Fifth
National Public Management Conference, College Station, TX, Dec. 3-4, 1999,
on file with author) (finding that negotiated rulemaking was used for rules that
were relatively easier to resolve); Jeffrey P. Cohn, Clearing the Air, Gov'T EX
ECUTIVE, Sept. 1, 1997, at 45, 50, available at 1997 WL 9254804 (stating that
"most negotiated rule-making involves relatively narrow rules" and usually
does not work for "[h]ighly politicized issues, ones with broad national implica
tions or ones that represent new policy directions").
10s Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 45.
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points for negotiated rulemakings, I fail "[t]o conduct an accu
rate empirical study of rulemaking."109 Actually, the danger is
just the opposite. If researchers studying the duration of
rulemaking were to make their own ad hoc decisions about when
a rulemaking begins and ends, their research would lack reliabil
ity.110 Without clear criteria for collecting data and making mea
surements, individual researchers would have to make their own
decisions about when an agency's rulemakings ended. Such an
approach would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
to verify and interpret results across studies.111
Thus, it is important for researchers to operationalize
rulemaking duration using a consistent, verifiable indicator such
as Federal Register notices or other uniform administrative in
dicators. This is almost certainly the reason that Neil Kerwin and
Scott Furlong opted for such an approach, relying on the dates
found in EPA's internal regulatory tracking system rather than
their own interpretation of when individual rulemakings were
completed.112 More recently, political scientists John \Vright and
Steven Balla conducted a further study of the length of negoti
ated rulemaking-again using the dates of notices in the Federal
Register.113 Choosing the date on which a final rule is promul109 Id. at 46. In suggesting that researchers should use the "actual, immediate
goal the agency hoped to accomplish," Harter appears to conceive of adminis
trative agencies as unified entities that typically possess a single, discernible
goal in a rulemaking. Id. Yet bureaucratic organizations are much more com
plex, with different actors in an agency possessing different goals. See JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 27-25!, {1989); R SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE
CASE OF THE CLEAN AlR Acr 38-43 {1983). Moreover, if Harter were correct
that in some cases the agency achieved its actual goal prior to the promulgation
of the final rule, then one might well have e:x-pected the agency to have promul
gated the final rule at that earlier time, or at least as soon after the close of the
comment period as possible. That the agency did not do so, and in some cases
worked for several more years before issuing a final rule, raises the likelihood
that there were other, more nuanced or complicated goals at stake in these
cases.
110 See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 (stressing the importance of
ensuring "that data-collection methods are reliable" so that "applying the same
procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure").
111 See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (stressing the importance of replicability and urging
that "scholars should always record the exact methods, rules, and procedures
used to gather information and draw inferences so that another researcher can
do the same thing and draw (one hopes) the same conclusion").
112 Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 40, at 121-22.
113 Balla & Wright, supra note 107, at 14 (using the time that elapsed be
tween the publication of the proposed rule and the issuance of the final rule).
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gated is particularly appropriate given that this is the point at
which the agency has taken a final, legally reviewable action. 114
Since one of the main goals attributed to negotiated rulemaking
is to reduce subsequent litigation over agency rules, it is entirely
appropriate to use the publication of the final rule as the ending
point of a negotiated rulemaking for purposes of evaluation.
Even Langbein and Kerwin, in the study that Harter praises, re
gard the outcome of the negotiated rulemaking as the promulga
tion of the final rule.115
Moreover, as any administrative lawyer knows, the rulemak
ing process does not necessarily end once the agency issues a fi
nal rule. Even putting aside any subsequent litigation, agencies
do revisit their final rules, amend and revise them, and even oc
casionally rescind them. 116 Researchers who free themselves
from a consistent data collection rule face an extremely wide
range of potential starting and ending points for any particular
rulemaking. For example, as I note in Assessing Consensus, the
negotiated rulemaking over drinking water standards for disin
fectant byproducts had, by 1996, resulted in a final rule governing
the collection of drinking water information even though the
substantive drinking water standards based on the negotiations
still remained as proposed rules.117 I use the date of the "first
final rule to emerge from this negotiated rulemaking process,
even though it is an information collection rule and not a drink
ing water standard" simply to ensure that my estimates are em
ployed consistently and conservatively.118 The farmworker
protection rule is yet another example of a rulemaking that did
not really end with the promulgation of a final rule. As I note in
Assessing Consensus, debate over the farmworker protection
rule persists: "EPA has issued extensions and changes to the rule,

u.s.c. § 704 (1994).
Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 603.
116 For example, consider, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra•
tion's passenger restraint requirements which the agency rescinded in 1981. See
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of Am. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 34-40 (1983) (noting that "the requirement has been imposed, amended,
rescinded, reimposed, and now rescinded again" and giving detailed history).
117 Drinking Water Information Collection Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (May
14, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141); Enhanced Surface Water 'Il'eat•
ment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832 (proposed July 29, 1994) (to be codi•
fied at 40 C.F.R. 141, 142); Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed.
Reg. 38,668 (proposed July 29, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 141, 142).
118 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1283 n.120.
114
115

5
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Congress has entered the fray, and outside groups have
threatened litigation." 119 Opening measurement to ad hoc judg
ments would not only enable some to claim that rulemaking was
shorter in some cases, but it would also allow others to claim that
rulemaking was still longer in other cases.
The approach I take in my empirical research adheres to
sound social science research standards in that it relies on neu
tral, consistent methods of calculating the duration of rulemak
ing. Harter's approach, on the other hand, tips the scales in favor
of finding a time savings for negotiated rulemaking. He makes
adjustments that shorten the process for negotiated rulemaking,
but he never acknowledges the need to be consistent and make
similar adjustments to the comparison group of rules adopted
through conventional notice-and-comment procedures. 120 Har
ter claims, for example, that an earlier ending date should be
used for the equipment leaks rule because the EPA issued an
early notice of the agreement in the equipment leaks rulemaking
"so industry could begin taking actions to comply." 121 In an ear
lier article, Harter notes that many firms "were complying with
the rule long before it was in effect." 122 He similarly argues that
the ending date of the reformulated gasoline rule should be
moved up by about eight months because that was the time when
the EPA held a series of workshops "so that those affected could
119 Id. at 1279 n.111.
120 Cf. KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 28 (noting that "deliberately choosing
cases that support our theory" is an "obvious example" of biased empirical in
ference). Harter draws attention, for instance, to the fact that the Coast Guard
issued a circular and an interim rule before it promulgated a final rule in the
negotiated rulemaking on vessel response plans. Harter, Assessing the Asses
sors, supra note 5, at 43-44. Although he argues that the agency accomplished
its goals by issuing these interim documents, the fact is that the Coast Guard
still made significant modifications before promulgating the final rule, indicat
ing that the agency had not in fact satisfied all its goals. See Vessel Response
Plans, 61 Fed. Reg.1052 (Jan.12, 1996) (discussing substantive changes made to
interim rule). More significantly, even assuming that an interim rule were a
meaningful end point for a rulemaking that generates a subsequent final rule,
one would need to recognize that the issuance of interim rules is not uncommon
in current conventional rulemaking practices. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, In
terim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 AoMIN. L. REv. 703, 712-15 (1999}
(documenting the increasing use of interim rules by administrative agencies).
To be consistent, analysts need to make similar judgments about the ending
points for conventional rulemaking processes, which with some frequency in
clude the issuance of interim guidances along the way to a final rule. Harter
does not do this.
121 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 46.
122 Harter, Fear of Commitment, supra note 5, 1427 app. B.
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comply." 123 Yet what Harter fails to acknowledge is that regu
lated entities often take steps to comply with looming environ
mental regulations well in advance of agency rules coming into
effect. In many corporations and trade associations, lawyers and
managers regularly work to anticipate the EPA's regulatory
agenda, taking steps to bring their organizations and members
into compliance before the final rules take effect. 124 This is espe
cially the case with regard to regulations affecting equipment or
production processes, as compliance can require significant capi
tal expenditures and lead time for planning. It is in firms' inter
ests to avoid the risk of business interruption or regulatory
liability, so firms often plan ahead and begin taking steps to com
ply after an agency issues a proposed or interim rule or otherwise
signals its regulatory direction. 125
Overall, Harter presents his data in such a way as to favor
negotiated rulemaking. He argues that if one negotiated rule is
excluded from study, and if the duration of two other rules is
shortened, the average duration of the EPA's negotiated
rulemakings is only 751 days instead of 1,013 days, or thirty-five
percent shorter than the average duration reported in my
study. 126 This reduction in average duration arises because the
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 48.
See, e.g., Vicki Norberg-Bohm & Mark Rossi, The Power of Incremental•
ism: Environmental Regulation and Technological Change in Pulp and Paper
Bleaching in the US, 10 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT, 225,227 (1998)
. 123

124

(noting that "innovation may begin prior to actual promulgation of environ
mental standards"); Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton, Regulation and
Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP,
PRoBs. 109, 120 (1983) (noting that the anticipation of the new regulations
often prompts firms to make technological changes and come into substantial
compliance well before the regulations are fully promulgated).
125 See FOREST L. REINHARDT, DoWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRIN•
CIPLES To ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 140-55 (2000) (describing firms that
installed equipment in advance of the imposition of regulatory requirements).
126 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 57 tbl.1. Harter also
states that the average duration of all negotiated rulemaking-by EPA as well
as other agencies-should be lowered. He achieves this claimed reduction by
truncating the duration of the Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan rulemaking,
see supra note 120, and by excluding from the set of negotiated rules OSHA's
rulemaking on occupational exposure to benzene. He claims it is inappropriate
to include the benzene negotiations because OSH A never sent a representative
to participate in them. Harter, Asssessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 22
n.88. While it is true that OSHA did not take an active role as a participant in
this negotiated rulemaking, "[t]his kind of agency nonparticipation had been
recognized as one of the two basic forms of negotiated rulemaking." Perritt,
supra note 16, at 1660. See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative

2001]

ASSESSING THE ADVOCACY OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAK/NG

413

one rule that Harter argues should be excluded-the farmworker
protection rule-happened to be the negotiated rulemaking with
the longest duration. In addition, the two other rules-the
equipment leaks and reformulated gasoline rules-were among
those negotiated rules with the longest durations. Harter also
questions the dates I use to calculate the duration of a fourth
rule-the drinking water collection rule-although he does not
change the dates I use in making his alternative calculation. 127 In
all, Harter disputes my time computations for the four EPA ne
gotiated rules that had the longest rulemaking duration.
Due to the nature of an average (or mean) as a statistical
measure, the average duration of negotiated rulemaking would
indeed drop substantially if one were to remove the longest ne
gotiated rulemaking from the group and also considerably
shorten the duration of other rulemakings that took a longer
time. This is explainable as a property of the statistic, since aver
ages tend to be sensitive to outlying cases. Indeed, when analyz
ing a distribution of data with outliers in only a positive
direction-such as with income or time, which can never be less
than zero-the average will tend to be pulled upwards.1 28 In
such cases, the median will generally be a more suitable indicator
of the typical case, as it is less sensitive to extreme outliers. 129 It
is especially appropriate for a researcher to report the median in
these cases, something that I did and Kerwin and Furlong did,
but Harter did not.
As Table 1 shows, Kerwin and Furlong report an average
rulemaking duration (1108 days) that was higher than the median
duration (872 clays). My analysis results in a similar distribution:
a higher average duration for EPA's negotiated rulemakings
Dispute Resolution: The Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other
Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 863, 881 (1987) (noting that Harter recognizes that

negotiated rulemaking can occur without the participation of the agency). Per
ritt included the benzene negotiations in his evaluations of negotiated rulemak
ing. See id. at 874. ACUS also included this rule in all its lists of federal agency
negotiated rulemakings. ACUS, 1990 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 80, at 336;
ACUS, 1995 SoURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 382; ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS,
supra note 80, at 50.
121 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 48.
128 See NEIL A. WEISS, lNmooucroRY STATISTICS 129-30 (5th ed. 1999).
129 See id. at 130 (showing that the median is a more resistant descriptive
statistic, meaning that it is less sensitive to the influence of a few extreme data
points). Accord Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 610-11 (acknowledging
that the median is the better measure of the typical number of comments filed
on proposed rules when there are outliers).
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TABLE 1:
RULEMAKINGS (IN DAYS)

EPA

Conventional Rules
Negotiated Rules
(Kerwin & Furlong)
( Coglianese)
1108'
1013b
Average Duration
777c
sn•
Median Duration
• Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 40, at 134.
b Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1283-84.
c Id. at 1284 n.123.
d Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 57.

Negotiated Rules
(Harter)
7Sl d
743

(1013 days) than a median duration for these same rules (872
days). This suggests that conventional rulemaking has had its
outlying cases, just as has negotiated rulemaking. Harter's aver
age for negotiated rulemaking is different, but only because he
has truncated the data on negotiated rulemakings. Even though
Harter's average duration is substantially lower than what I find,
his median duration for negotiated rulemaking, not surprisingly,
differs very little. 130 When the data are properly analyzed, the
median-as well as the average-duration of EPA's negotiated
rulemakings is only ninety-five days shorter than the respective
data from Kerwin and Furlong's comparison group. It should be
remembered, of course, that by using the notice of intent to ne
gotiate as the starting point for each rule, rather than EPA's in
ternal records (the Kerwin and Furlong approach), 131 my study
understates the duration of negotiated rulemaking by about 131
days compared with the approach used by Kerwin and
Furlong. 132
130 The median duration I reported for the twelve EPA negotiated rules was
777 days, while the median duration calculated using the numbers claimed by
Harter is 743 days. Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1284
n.123; Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at S7 tbl.1. This would
mean that by Harter's computations negotiated rulemaking yields at best only
about four months savings in median duration.
131 Kerwin and Furlong relied on EPA's "elaborate internal management
mechanism," which, according to Kerwin and Furlong, has "reliable historical
files on each rulemaking." Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 40, at 119-20.
132 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1283. Furthermore, the
findings from an independent study of rulemaking duration, conducted by polit
ical scientists Steven Balla and John Wright, confirm the basic conclusion that
negotiated rulemaking does not shorten the regulatory process. After compar
ing the duration of rulemakings completed using different forms of public par
ticipation, Balla and Wright conclude:
Our research demonstrates ... that rules to which regulatory negotiation
was applied took longer to issue than those developed through conven•
tional proceedings, despite the fact agencies were more likely to conduct
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C. Negotiated Rulemaking Demands More Time and Effort
by Participants
No matter what one concludes about the impact of negoti
ated rulemaking on the duration of the regulatory process. nego
tiated rulemaking still demands more time and effort on the part
of the participants than does conventional rulemaking. 133 Even
if the overall duration of negotiated rulemakings could be shown
to be shorter,134 the intensity of negotiated rulemakings still
translates into additional time. As Harter huruielf acknowledges,
"[r]eg negs are intense activities: participating in one can be ex
pensive and time consuming." 135 The Langbein and Kerwin
study, which Harter considers "rigorous" and ..careful," 136 shows
that participants in negotiated rulemakings report spending
nearly twice as much overall in organizational resources as did
their counterparts in conventional rulemakings. 137 Strikingly,
participants in negotiated rulemakings are three times more
likely to complain that the process takes too much time and ef
fort.138 Whatever one makes of the impact of negotiation on the
duration of rulemakings, there is no disputing that negotiated
rulemaking is much more burdensome, in terms of the overall
time and expense, than conventional rulemaking. 139
regulatory negotiations in situations that were amenable to relatively
rapid resolution. In general, we find no evidence that consensual
rulemaking reduces the time it takes to develop rules.
Balla & Wright, supra note 107, at 26-27.
133 As Laura Langbein and Jody Freeman put it, "[t)his is one claim about
reg neg that has no counterclaim." Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regula
tory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL LJ. 60, 109
(2000). See also Mark Seidenfeld, Empoweri11g Stakeholders: Limits on Collab
oration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L REv. 411, 457
(2000) (observing that "all commentators agree that negotiated rulemaking is
an intensive process requiring a concentrated devotion of resources by the
agency and private negotiation participants").
134 As discussed in Part II.B, the evidence does not support such a
conclusion.
135 Harter, Fear of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1420. See also it!. at 1421
(admitting that negotiated rulemaking "is unquestionably an intense process").
136 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55-56.
137 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 620.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 97 n.176 (acknowledg
ing the "resource-intensive nature of reg neg"); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN,
RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAw AND l'\1AKE POLICY
190 (1st ed. 1994) (observing that negotiated rulemaking demands an "ex
traordinary commitment of time" from individuals and that "negotiation ses
sions themselves are demanding activities that can wreak havoc \\ith nonnal
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III
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND THE AVOIDANCE
OF LITIGATION

Over the years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking consist
ently claimed that the procedure would eliminate subsequent liti
gation filed challenging administrative rules. 140 Yet until I
undertook my research, no one had sought to assess these claims
by collecting comprehensive data on court filings for negotiated
and conventional rules. Having collected this data for the EPA, I
find that six out of the twelve completed EPA negotiated rules in
my study have resulted in legal challenges, a litigation rate higher
than that for all significant rules under EPA's major statutes and
almost twice as high as that for EPA rules generally. 141 Harter
does not dispute that these challenges to negotiated rules were
filed. 142 Rather, he claims that negotiated rulemaking was never
really meant to reduce litigation. 143 He also claims that I fail to
account for differences in litigation and that when these differ
ences are considered, negotiated rulemaking results in less pro
tracted litigation. 144 In this Part, I demonstrate that Harter is
wrong on both counts: negotiated rulemaking has long aimed to
reduce legal challenges to agency rules and it has failed to reduce
both the number and intensity of these challenges.
work responsibilities"); Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Per
spective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647, 10,651 (Oct. 1992) ("A major
disadvantage of the reg-neg process is that it can be extremely resource-inten
sive and stressful."); ACUS, BUILDING CoNSENsus, supra note 80, at 28 (re
porting that the Department of Agriculture has found negotiated rulemaking to
be "expensive"); OFFICE oF THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 42, at 31-32
("The most significant deterrent to using negotiated rulemaking is its up-front
cost. ... (T]he concentrated investment of effort and expense in the short term
may be a serious obstacle."); Program Evaluation Division, supra note 78, at 23,
30 (noting that "EPA managers who have been the Agency's negotiators have
devoted far more time to the negotiations in which they were involved than
they ordinarily would spend on a single rulemaking effort").
140 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
141 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1298-1301.
142 Harter even quotes a passage from Langbein and Kerwin in which they
state that "negotiated rules appear no more (or less) subject to litigation than
conventional rules." Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55 (quot
ing Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 625). Langbein and Kerwin acknowl
edge that there is "little difference" in the litigation rates for negotiated rules
and conventional rules. Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 614-15.
143 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 180-192.
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A. Avoiding Litigation Has Long Been a Goal of
Negotiated Rulemaking
Harter suggests that it really does not matter that negotiated
rulemaking has failed to prevent litigation. According to Harter,
negotiated rulemaking was not originally intended to reduce liti
gation. For example, he asserts that "those who were present at
the creation of reg-neg sought neither expedition nor a shield
against litigation."145 Yet negotiation has long been offered,
even in the early years, as an alternative that would reduce the
perceived adversarial relationship between business and govem
ment.146 Former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop initiated inter
est in negotiated rulemaking in the 1970s by calling attention to
several problems with government regulation, one of which was
"the legal game-playing between the regulatees and the regula
tors. "147 According to Dunlop, typically the "regulatory agency
promulgates a regulation; the regulatees challenge it in court; if
they lose, their lawyers may seek to find another ground for ad
ministrative or judicial challenge."148 He urged regulators to in
volve affected parties in the development of new rules so as to
reduce the contentiousness, delays, and lawsuits that he per
ceived to be afflicting the regulatory process.149
Philip Harter himself, in his original article on negotiated
rulemaking, advocated negotiated rulemaking as a cure for a
"bitterly adversarial" 150 regulatory process:
Negotiations may reduce judicial challenges to a rule because
those parties most directly affected, who are also the most
likely to bring suits, actually would participate in its develop
ment. Indeed, because the rule would reflect the agreement of
the parties, even the most vocal constituencies should support
14s Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 54.
146 See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation?,
HARv. Bus. R.E.v., May-June 1981, at 86, 91-92 (noting a substantial increase in
the number of regulatory lawyers in Washington, D.C., and advocating regula
tory negotiation as a solution to the "fruitless confrontation" and "protracted
regulatory battles" perpetuated by lawyers); Peter H. Schuck, Litigation, Bar
gaining, and Regulation, REGULATION, July-August 1979, at 26 (urging negotia
tion to avoid the "chronic fractiousness" of policymaking in the United States).
See also Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 18 n.96 (citing early work
complaining of adversarial relationships between business and government).
147 John T. Dunlop, The Linzits of Legal Compulsion, 21 LAB. LI. 67, 71
{1976).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 72.
150 Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 1, at 18.
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the rule. This abstract prediction finds support in experience
in analogous contexts. For example, there has been virtually
no judicial review of OSHA's recent safety standards that
were based on a consensus among the interested parties.
Moreover, rules resulting from settlements have not been
challenged.151

Moreover, according to Judge Loren Smith, chairman of ACUS
at the time the Conference acted on Harter's report, "when we
passed the first recommendation [encouraging agencies to use
negotiated rulemaking] ... , the Reagan Administration's whole
purpose on negotiated rulemaking was to keep things out of the
courts."152 In chronicling EPA's decision to launch its regulatory
negotiation project in 1983, Daniel Fiorino and Chris Kirtz ob
served that the ACUS recommendation was one of the factors
prompting EPA to pursue negotiated rulemaking.153 Further
more, they point explicitly to the desire by EPA officials to re
duce litigation:
[P]erhaps most importantly, people within the EPA were be
coming more aware of the limits of conventional, adversarial
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. The
standard rulemaking process had become too susceptible to
151 Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted). See also supra note 13 and accompanying
text. Harter did nevertheless originally predict that negotiated rules would be
subjected to some litigation; however, over time he has become even more fer
vent in asserting that negotiated rules are resistant to legal challenge. See Cog
lianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1295 n.179 (noting the shift in
Harter's claims about litigation).
152 Colloquium, The Fifth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the Admi11-

istrative Process: The First Year of Clinton/Gore: Reinventing Government or
Refining Reagan/Bush Initiatives?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 23, 62 (1994) (state

ment by Judge Loren Smith).
l53 See Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated
Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 29, 29 (1985). One of the
leading figures in the development of the regulatory negotiation project at
EPA, Joseph Cannon, apparently was motivated by his commitment to "the
idea that many disputes were best resolved out of court." Susskind & McMa•
hon, supra note 101, at 142 n.53. EPA Administrator Lee Thomas similarly
stressed EPA's desire to shorten rulemaking time and reduce litigation as
among the chief reasons for the agency's regulatory negotiation initiative. Lee
M. Thomas, The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation, supra note 77, at 3.
Furthermore, the training material EPA provided to participants in its second
negotiated rulemaking described EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Project as an
opportunity to "test whether negotiation at an early stage of rulemaking can
produce rules more quickly, less expensively, and with less likelihood of litiga
tion." EPA, TRAINING SESSION ON NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES FOR THE PESTI
CIDE EXEMPTION NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE 1 (Sept. 27, 1984), reprinted i11
ACUS, 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 199, 202.
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delay and litigation. As many as 80 percent of EPA•s final
rules are challenged-often by both sides of an issue. A pilot
program on regulatory negotiation offered an opportunity to
test an alternative method for proposing Agency rules that
would permit all participants a face-to-face role in decision
making.154
As one can plainly see, the aim of avoiding litigation motivated
both the original ACUS recommendation urging agencies to pur
sue negotiated rulemaking and EPA's decision to launch its regu
latory negotiation project.
Admittedly, over the years advocates of negotiated rulemak
ing have claimed a number of additional benefits from negoti
ated rulemaking,155 but from the very beginning proponents have
consistently claimed that it will reduce legal challenges to agency
rules.156 Numerous practitioners, academics, legislators, and
agency officials have advocated negotiated rulemaking as a way
of reducing subsequent litigation, which many erroneously
thought had reached the point where groups challenged four out
of every five regulations EPA issued. 157 The Negotiated
Rulemaking Act included in its preamble the goal of reducing
the likelihood of litigation. 158 In addition, Republican and Dem
ocratic administrations endorsed the use of negotiated rulemak
ing, in no small part because of the belief that the procedure

Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 153, at 29.
For example, in a recent discussion of EPA's public participation efforts,
Charles Fox of EPA opined that the rules his agency negotiated have been
"more practical and cost efficient, contained more innovative solutions, were
more technically and scientifically current, and had greater legitimacy." J.
Charles Fox, A Real Public Role, 15 ENVTL. F. 19, 24 {1998). He also asserted
that negotiated rulemaking has saved the agency time and has prevented litiga
tion. Id.
156 For a detailed account of the emphasis placed on litigation avoidance in
the legislative history leading up to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and
its permanent reauthorization in 1996, see Coglianese, Assessi11g Co11se11s11s,
supra note 2, at 1262-71.
157 For an extensive bibliography of this literature, see id. at 1343 app. D.
The refrain of Lawrence Susskind reflects the tenor of the literature: "All too
often government regulations end up as the subject of lawsuits. We could re
duce this wrangling if the opposing sides drafted the regulations together."
Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 38.
158 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, supra note 16, Pub. L No.
101-648, § 2(5), 104 Stat. 4969 ("Negotiated rulemaking can increase the ac
ceptability and improve the substance of rules, making it Jess likely that the
affected parties will resist enforcement or challenge such rules in court.").
154

155
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would minimize litigation. 159 Advocates have consistently em
phasized negotiated rulemakil!g's potential for reducing litiga
tion, and even the earliest "pioneers" of the process have
boasted (inaccurately) that the negotiation process has "almost
eliminated" subsequent litigation160 and that "no rule crafted in
this manner has been subjected to court action." 161
B. Negotiated Rulemaking Has Failed to Reduce Litigation
Even though Harter erroneously suggests that it does not
really matter that negotiated rulemaking has generated a consid
erable number of legal challenges, 162 he nevertheless makes sev
eral forcefully worded, but mistaken, criticisms of my analysis of
negotiated rulemaking and litigation. 163 For example, he first ac
cuses me of "significantly misleading" the reader by including a
discussion of the Grand Canyon visibility negotiation in Assess
ing Consensus, because it was not technically a negotiated
rulemaking. 164 At the same time, however, he readily acknowl
edges that my article "points out that this rule was not developed
l59 The Clinton Administration's National Performance Review urged the
use of negotiated rulemaking as an effective alternative to a rulemaking process
that, in language Harter quotes, "encourages adversarial, uncooperative behav
ior on the part of private industry or others who might be affected by an
agency's decisions, which frequently leads to protracted litigation." OFFICE OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 42, at 29, quoted in Harter, Assessing the As
sessors, supra note 5, at 37. In addition to signing the reauthorization of the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, President Clinton also issued several directives to
agencies to use negotiated rulemaking. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
§§ 638, 642-43 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §§ 601, 644-645 (1994); Negotiated
Rulemaking, Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected Agencies
[and the] Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 58
Fed. Reg. 52,391 (Oct. 7, 1993); President's Memorandum on Regulatory Re•
form, 1995 Pus. PAPERS 304,305 (Mar. 4, 1995); President William Clinton and
Vice President Albert Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation 5, 9 (1995)
(available from the ELR Doc. Serv., ELR Order No. AD-979). President Bush
signed the original Negotiated Rulemaking Act, stating that negotiated
rulemaking would provide "a means of avoiding costly and time-consuming liti•
gation." President's Statement on Signing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of
1990, 1990 Pus. PAPERS 1716 (Nov. 29, 1990).
160 JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 48 (1997).
161 Philip J. Harter & Daniel Finkelstein, The Coke Ovens' Regulatory Nego•
tiation: From Choking Controversy to Consensus Relief, 2 J. ENvrL. PERMIT•
TING 343, 345 (1993).
162 See supra Part III.A.
163 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 52 (asserting that "Cog•
lianese paints a substantially misleading picture").
164 Id. at 50.
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under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act." 165 In addition to stating
that the rule was not technically a negotiated rulemaking under
the Act, I also expressly exclude the Grand Canyon rule when
calculating and discussing the overall litigation rate for EPA's ne
gotiated rules. 166 Nevertheless, mentioning the litigation over
the Grand Canyon rule as I do is far from misleading-it is rele
vant and highly probative support for the proposition that ..rules
promulgated following a regulatory negotiation are far from im
mune from legal challenge." 167 The Grand Canyon rule was
probably the most well publicized of any EPA regulatory negoti
ation, having concluded with a dramatic presidential ceremony
near the edge of the Grand Canyon and prompting a front-page
New York Times article hailing the negotiation process as a
model alternative to the "lawsuit system." 168 Moreover, at the
time of my original research, the Grand Canyon rule had been
heralded as a negotiated rulemaking success story by one of the
sponsors of the Senate bill permanently reauthorizing the Nego
tiated Rulemaking Act. 169 At that time, however, the rulemak
ing had been discussed in the legal literature only "as a prototype
'\vin-,vin' solution of an environmental problem and a model for
other regulatory negotiations." 170 Thus, including mention of the
Grand Canyon litigation actually helps to correct the misleading
impression that regulatory negotiation eliminates subsequent le
gal challenges to agency rules.

165 Id. Indeed, I note at the outset of my discussion of this prominent regula
tory negotiation that it was "not conducted under the auspices of the Negoti
ated Rulemaking Act." Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1288.
In a footnote, I elaborate that EPA did not invoke the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act because the negotiations occurred after, instead of before, the publication
of the proposed rule. Id. at 1288 n.138.
166 Id. at 1301-1302.
161 Id. at 1287.
168 See Matthew L Wald, U.S. Agencies Use Negotiations to Preempt Law
Suits Over Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al, quoted ill Coglianese, As
sessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1289 (describing the Grand Canyon visibility
rule).
169 Gov't Press Release, Clinton Signs Levin's Bill Encouraging Gol'ernme/11
Innovation (Oct. 21, 1996), available at 1996 WL 11125786 (press release issued
by Senator Carl Levin).
110 D. Michael Rappoport & John F. Cooney, V,sibility at the Grand Canyon:
Regulatory Negotiations Under tlze Clean Air Act, 24 ARIZ. ST. LI. 627, 627
(1992).
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Harter also charges that I fail to look into the details sur
rounding the challenged negotiated rules and their litigation. 171
This claim is yet another example of Harter's advocacy. Even a
cursory reading of Assessing Consensus reveals that I devote con
siderable attention to the details surrounding all six EPA negoti
ated rulemakings that were subject to legal action, stating exactly
who filed each petition for review, why, and to what effect. 172
Harter's claim that I fail to look at what happened in these cases
is all the more interesting since he himself provides only two
paragraphs in his article to the litigated rules, compared with the
more than eight pages contained in my original article. 173 He de
votes a mere eleven words to the litigation challenging the disin
fectant byproducts rule compared with the page and a half I
devote to that rule and its subsequent legal challenge. 174
Perhaps because his own discussion of the challenged rules
is so brief, Harter creates some confusion about the litigation
filed against the reformulated gasoline rule and the equipment
leaks rule. 175 Without denying that court petitions were filed
171 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 50 (asserting that "Cog
lianese fails to look at either what happened in the negotiated rulemaking itself
or the nature of the challenges").
172 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2 at 1290-92, 1302-1308.
173 Compare Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 50-52, with
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1290-92, 1302-1308.
174 Compare Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 51, with Cog
lianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1306-1307. I recognize that for
some readers it may seem unusual to compare the number of words or pages
contained in scholarly articles, but the stark contrast in the volume of text alone
provides a clear indication of the degree to which I provide background infor
mation about EPA's challenged negotiated rulemakings. This point bears em
phasizing since Freeman and Langbein have echoed Harter's charges, criticizing
my study for failing to provide "contextual details" while characterizing Hur
ter's brief treatment as "a detailed analysis of the circumstances surrounding a
variety of challenges to negotiated rules." Freeman & Langbein, supra note
133, at 145 n.357 and accompanying text. The reality is that Harter gives scant
attention to these challenges, and offers no new information, while I provide
more detailed information about all the challenges to EPA's negotiated rules
than found anywhere else in the literature.
175 In this brief discussion Harter also manages to make another mistake. In
a footnote to his discussion of EPA's negotiated rulemaking on the under
ground injection of hazardous wastes (initiated under RCRA), he confuses this
negotiated rulemaking with one that EPA proposed, but ultimately abandoned,
on underground injection control for Class II wells in connection with oil and
gas drilling (initiated under the Safe Drinking Water Act). In his discussion of
the RCRA rule, Harter suggests that I mistakenly treat the SDWA rule as aban
doned and claims that the latter was also negotiated. Harter, Assessing the As
sessors, supra note 5, at 51 n.97 (asserting that the Class II underground
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challenging these rules, he nevertheless mistakenly implies that
the challenges I attribute to these two rules were actually filed
against related, but distinct EPA rules that were not negoti
ated.176 Yet, even though petitions were filed against related
injection control negotiated rulemaking "continued to full term but no agree
ment was reached"). Yet the record is clear that EPA really did abandon the
SDWA negotiated rulemaking on Class II wells. EPA's own internal lists of its
negotiated rulemaking do not even mention the Class II underground injection
control matter. See, e.g., EPA, NEGOTIATED RuLEl\fAKING AT THE ENVIROS·
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 4 (Mar. 1992) (on file with the author); EPA,
NEGOTIATED RULEl\fAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGE.'-C't' 5
(Oct.1992) (on file with the author); EPA, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 6 (Nov. 18, 1994) (on file with the au
thor). The ACUS list of EPA's negotiated rulemakings docs mention the issue,
but notes that even though "EPA considered establishing a committee to nego
tiate rules under the Safe Drinking Water Act, pertaining to underground injec
tion control associated with oil and gas production[, t]he agency subsequently
decided not to go forward with negotiations, but did form a committee to give
advice on options." ACUS, 1995 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 392. EPA did
initially indicate its inclination to move forward to propose amendments to its
underground injection control rules for Class II wells using a negotiated
rulemaking process. See Underground Injection Control, Class II, Wells; Intent
to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Amendments to Regulations, 56
Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 7, 1991). However, only a few months later EPA deter
mined that it was not sure that amendments to these rules were yet warranted
and decided that it would not proceed with a negotiated rulemaking. See Un
derground Injection Control, Class II, Wells; Intent to Form an Advisory Com
mittee to Resolve Issues Related to the Class II Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,521,
14,521 (Apr. 10, 1991). Instead it established an advisory committee to consider
the "potential" for creating new amendments to the Class II well program. See
Establishment and Open Meeting of the EPA Advisory Committee for Class II
Underground Injection Control Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,672, 26,673 (June 10,
1991). The Federal Register notice of the first meeting of this ad\isory commit
tee nowhere mentions that the committee was proceeding with a negotiated
rulemaking. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 26,673. My interview notes, taken in the
course of conducting my research for Assessi11g Co11Se11sus, indicate that the key
EPA staff member involved in this process reported that about seven ad\isory
committee meetings were held from the middle of 1991 to early 1992, but that
by the mid-1990s EPA made a decision to abandon any further efforts to con
sider new Class II well regulations for the oil and gas industry.
176 On the reformulated gasoline rule, Harter states that "[t]here were indeed
a number of challenges to the application of the rule, but amazingly few chal
lenges to the rule itself." Harter, Assessuzg the Assessors, supra note 5, at 50
(footnotes omitted) (citing the challenge to the renewable ox-ygenatcs compan
ion rule in connection ,vith the "application of the rule") (emphasis added). On
the equipment leaks rule, Harter admits that it was challenged, but suggests
that the challenge may have been to other portions of the Hazardous Organics
NESHAPS (HON) rule, to which the equipment leaks rule was attached. Har
ter, Assessuzg the Assessors, supra note 5, at 51 (asserting that "a challenge to
other parts of the HON should not be ascribed to the Equipment Leaks part of
the rule"). Following Harter's example, Freeman and Langbein also claim that
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rules, court records in both cases show that petitioners also chal
lenged the very rules which were developed through negotiated
rulemaking. 177 Although those who advocate negotiated
rulemaking have created some ambiguity on this point, the fact is
that the reformulated gasoline rule itself was challenged178 as was
the equipment leaks portion of the HON rule which was devel
oped through negotiated rulemaking. 179
Finally, Harter claims that I fail to distinguish "substantive
challenges" from other kind of challenges, and that negotiated
rules have been "remarkably resistant" to such substantive chal
lenges.180 Since he never defines what he means by a "substan
tive challenge," it not possible to test or respond to his claim
fully. Once again, Harter's approach may well be understanda
ble as a form of advocacy, but it is unacceptable as a basis for
empirical analysis of negotiated rulemaking. 181 If, in claiming
that I fail to distinguish between "substantive" and other types of
challenges, Harter means to imply that I fail to report that most
of the challenges to negotiated rules were settled out of court,
then again a casual reading of Assessing Consensus is enough to
the legal challenges in these rulemakings only addressed aspects that were not
negotiated. Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 14S-46 n.212, 172 n.359
(arguing that the litigation filed against the equipment leaks and reformulated
gasoline rule only targeted aspects that were not negotiated).
111 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1307-1308 n.246.
11s See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb.
24, 1994); Texaco, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1143 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 2S, 1994). See
Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. EPA, No. 94-1142 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 1994); Amerada
Hess Corp. v. EPA, No. 94-1319 (D.C. Cir. Filed Apr. 1S, 1994); National Tonk
Truck Carriers, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. Filed Apr. 18, 1994). See
also Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1290-92.
119 See Attachment A to Settlement Agreement at 102-22, Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n
v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 30, 1996), quoted in Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus, supra note 2, at 1307 n.246. See also Coglianese, Assessing Consen•
sus, supra note 2, at 1304-1305.
1so Harter claims that "the rules that have emerged from negotiated rulemak
ing have been remarkably resistant to substantive challenges" and that "reg
negs have been phenomenally successful in warding off substantive review."
Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 51-52. Without any definition
of what counts as a "substantive" lawsuit, Harter's claims are not falsifiable, a
central requirement for social science research. KING ET AL., supra note 33, at
100-105 (explaining that social science claims must be capable of being shown
to be wrong). As discussed in the text infra, all observable indicators reveal
that litigation filed against EPA's negotiated rules does not differ in any appre
ciable way from that filed generally against EPA rules.
1s1 KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 20 (noting that empirical claims should "be
as concrete as possible. Vaguely stated theories and hypotheses serve no pur
pose but to obfuscate.").
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1
Harter notes that several of the
show that he is mistaken.82
challenges to negotiated rules were withdrawn after settlement
talks in several cases, but in each case I already note this in As
sessing Consensus. 183 In fact, I specifically report that "only two
of the six challenged rules reached an appellate panel for a deci
sion," the rest having been voluntarily dismissed by the
parties.184
I also report-and this is most crucial-that most petitions
for review of EPA rules are voluntarily dismissed by the par
ties.185 Indeed, settlement is more common in litigation challeng
ing EPA rules than with other litigation. As I report in an earlier
study cited in Assessing Consensus, "[t]he settlement rate for
EPA rule challenges in the DC Circuit ... is nearly twice that for
all appeals ... and substantially more than the rate for all admin
istrative appeals."186 Organizations filing suits challenging EPA
rules often do so to preserve the opportunity to work out addi
tional changes in the rule, aware that the underlying environmen
tal statutes authorizing judicial review require such suits to be
filed, if at all, within a few months of the promulgation of the
final rule.187 For many organizations filing petitions for review of
182 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1290-92, 1302-1307
{describing legal challenges to negotiated rules and their disposition). Further
more, a reading of an earlier study of mine, cited in Assessing Consensus, is
enough to show that Harter is mistaken in suggesting that I more generally
failed to appreciate different kinds of litigation. Cary Coglianese, Litigating
Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturba11ce in the Regulatory Process, 30
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 735, 736-37, 753-62 {1996) [hereinafter Coglianese, Litigat
ing Within Relationships] (emphasizing the heterogeneity of litigation).
183 For example, Harter notes that, in the equipment leaks rule, the chemical
industry simply "filed a defensive challenge while it worked out some minor
details of the regulation. Those negotiations were successful and the challenge
was withdrawn." Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 51. I already
described these settlement negotiations and reported that this challenge was
ultimately withdrawn. Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 13041305, 1307 n.246.
184 Id. at 1308.
185 Id.
186 Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships, supra note 182, at 756
(parentheticals omitted), cited in Coglianese, Asssessing Conse11sus, supra note
2, at 1308 n.247.
187 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994) (60-day period); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l) {1994) (120-day period); Resource Conserva
tion and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(l} (1994) (90-day period); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7 (1994) (45-day period); Surface ?\-fining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(l) (1994) (60-day period);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(l) (1994) (60-day period).
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EPA rules, the petition simply signals the beginning of a new
round of working out the details of the rule with the agency. In
dustry and environmental groups frequently treat litigation as a
continuation of the rulemaking process, albeit with a smaller
number of participants. 1 ss
Thus when Harter suggests that negotiated rulemaking has
spared EPA highly protracted litigation because many of the
challenges to these rules were eventually withdrawn, he is actu
ally describing the normal pattern of challenges to EPA. As I
report in Assessing Consensus:
For all challenges to EPA rules filed in the D.C. Circuit be
tween 1979-1990, only 29% were resolved through adjudica
tion before an appellate panel. Negotiation and settlement
discussions typically follow the filing of challenges to any EPA
rule . . . . In the aggregate, negotiated rulemaking has not gen
erated any substantial difference in the way that legal chal
lenges get resolved. 189

Indeed, the litigation against negotiated rules turns out to be vir
tually the same as litigation against conventional rules along
every dimension, except that negotiated rules are challenged at a
higher rate. 190 A single rule can, of course, be challenged by
more than one organization. The data reveal not only that nego
tiated rules are challenged at a higher rate, but also that each
challenge involves on average a somewhat larger number of peti
tioners. As Table 2 shows, the average number of petitions filed
against negotiated rules is actually somewhat higher than the av
erage number of petitions in challenges to conventional rules
overall (3.7 petitions per challenged negotiated rule versus 3.0
for challenged conventional rules). 191 The rate at which these
challenges eventually reach a court for decision is about the same
as for challenges to conventional rules, and courts have been
equally deferential in adjudicated challenges to negotiated rules
as they are more generally in all challenges to EPA rules.1 92 The
typical challenge filed against an EPA negotiated rule does not
differ in any discernible way from the typical challenge filed
against a conventional rule.
l88
189
190
191

Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships, supra note 182, at 757-58.
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1308.
See infra tbl.2.
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1310 n.252.

192 Id.
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TABLE 2:
LITIGATION CHALLENGING EPA RULEMAKINGS
Rulemaking
Overall
35%"
3.0°

Percentage of Rules Challenged
Number of Petitions Filed Per
Challenge
Percentage of Filed Petitions
Decided by Court
Percentage of Adjudicated Cases
51% 6
Decided for EPA
• Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1300.
b Id.
< Id. at 1310 n.252
d Id.
• Id. at 1308 n.247.
1 Id. at 1308.
8 Id. at 1308-1309 n.249.
h Id.

C.

Negotiated
Rulemaking

33%'

Negotiated Rulemaking Engenders Additional Conflict

Not only does negotiated rulemaking fail to eliminate litiga
tion or reduce its intensity, it also results in more legal challenges
than would otherwise be expected. These legal challenges have
been filed both by participants in negotiated rulemakings and by
organizations who were not part of the negotiation process. 193
As I explain in Assessing Consensus, the failure of negotiated
rulemaking to live up to expectations is in part e::,..-plained by the
fact that conventional rulemaking at EPA has been much more
resistant to litigation than anyone previously believed. 19-1 It is
also the case that negotiation efforts do not resolve all conflicts.
and, in some ways, they can even engender new conflicts. As we
have seen, consensus is not always attainable, and even when it
is, it may only temporarily hide underlying conflicts. 195 Negoti
ated rulemaking also creates new sources of conflict that do not
exist ,vith other methods of policy making. 196 Conflicts can arise
over the selection of participants in the negotiations, the meaning
of agreements that are reached, and whether the final rule is con. 193 See id. at 1302.
194 Id. at 1330-34.
195 See supra Part II.A. See also Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra
note 2, at 1290-94 (describing conflicts underlying challenges to the rcfonnu
lated gasoline rule).
196 See Coglianese, Is Consensus Appropriate?, supra note 2, at 112-13.
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sistent with those agreements. 197 Disagreements can even arise
about the implications of silence in the agreement over particular
terms or issues. 198 None of these additional kinds of conflict
arise in the absence of negotiated rulemaking.
A recent negotiated rulemaking effort at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) illustrates one of these
new sources of conflict. HUD had originally named four public
housing organizations to serve on negotiated rulemaking com
mittees for regulations addressing subsidies and capital funds. 199
After the housing organizations subsequently filed a petition
against the agency over a separate matter, HUD officials unilat
erally declared that the organizations could no longer bargain
with the agency in good faith and removed them from the negoti
ated rulemaking committees.200 The housing groups filed for a
court order reversing their removal from the committee, arguing
that HUD's action discriminated against them in the exercise of
their fundamental right of petition.201 HUD eventually capitu
lated and reinstated the organizations as members of the negoti
ated rulemaking committees, but the experience demonstrates a
profound new source of litigated conflict that, ironically, is found
only in the very process that was intended to reduce litigation.
IV
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING'S PROMISE
REMAINS UNFULFILLED

Harter concludes his critique by downplaying the impor
tance of determining whether negotiated rulemaking reduces the
incidence of litigation or shortens the duration of the process:
He argues that the primary objective of negotiated rulemaking is
to create better regulatory policy and that it has achieved that
197 For examples of the range of conflicts engendered by negotiated rulemak
ing agreements, see Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1322-27.
198 Jd.
199 Notice of Intent to Establish a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 64
Fed. Reg. 5570, 5571 (Feb. 3, 1999); Establishment of Negotiated Rulemaking
Committee, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,920, 12,921 (Mar. 16, 1999).

200 HUD Tells PHA Organizations They Shouldn't Participate on Negotiated
Rulemaking Committees, [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (West),

757-58 (April 5, 1999).
201 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Council of Large Pub. Hous.
Auths., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1999) (No.
1:99CV00634).
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goal.202 According to Harter, negotiated rulemaking has proved
to be "an enormously powerful tool" for developing better
rules.203 He claims that negotiated rulemaking "has enabled the
parties to address the best, most effective, or most efficient way
of solving a regulatory controversy."204 These benefits, he ar
gues, "flow[] from the participation of those affected, who bring
with them a practical insight and expertise that can result in rules
that are better informed, more tailored to achieving the actual
regulatory goal, and hence, more effective and more
enforceable. "205
Harter claims that the findings of the study by Laura
Langbein and Neil Kenvin provide "particularly powerful" sup
port for his claim that negotiated rulemaking improves the qual
ity of regulatory decisions.206 That study reports that participants
in negotiated rulemakings perceive the resulting final rules more
favorably than do those who file comments in conventional
rulemakings.207 Once again, however, Harter engages in faulty
empirical analysis and uses it in an effort to bolster support for
negotiated rulemaking. The Langbein and Kenvin study actually
provides no basis for dra,ving inferences about the quality of ne
gotiated rules.208 Furthermore, Harter disregards the problems
that negotiated rulemaking can create and overlooks alternative
methods of public participation that can provide agencies with
the same "practical insight and expertise,"209 and other alleged
benefits of negotiated rulemaking, all ,vithout relying on consen
sus as the basis for public policy. In the absence of demonstrable
improvements in regulatory decisions, negotiated rulemaking's
failure to shorten the rulemaking process or reduce litigation will
remain a relevant and important consideration in evaluating the
role of formal negotiations in administrative law.
202 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 52. Freeman and
Langbein echo Harter, arguing that "time and litigation rates tell only part of
the story and although relevant, they remain secondary to improved rule qual
ity and legitimacy." Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 128.
203 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 56.
204 Id. at 38.
20s Id. at 54. Although Harter's rhetoric may sound a bit exaggerated, he is
not alone among advocates in sounding such an enthusiastic refrain. See, e.g.,
Fox, supra note 155.
206 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 56.
207 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 602-605.
208 See infra Part IV.A.
209 See supra note 205.
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A. Langbein and Kerwin's Study Does Not Address the
Quality of Rules
Laura Langbein and Cornelius Kerwin interviewed 101 par
ticipants in eight EPA negotiated rulemakings and fifty-one ran
domly selected individuals who had submitted comments in six
conventional rulemakings conducted by EPA.210 They asked
both sets of respondents a series of questions about their experi
ence with the rulemaking in which they were involved and about
their perceptions of the process and resulting rule.211 Using an
eleven-point scale (from -5 to +5), participants were asked to rate
the final rules on a number of criteria, including the economic
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the final rule, the quality of
the scientific evidence used to create the final rule, and the ap
propriateness of the final rule's use of technology.212 Langbein
and Kerwin found that the differences between the responses of
participants in negotiated and conventional rulemakings were in
many cases statistically significant and resulted in more positive
average ratings by the participants in negotiated rulemakings.213
Harter makes much of these differences, even to the point of in
cluding Langbein and Kerwin's data in a table in his article, and
urges that they demonstrate that negotiated rulemaking does
achieve better rules.214 The Langbein and Kerwin study, he ar
gues, shows that "[t]he benefits envisioned by the proponents of
negotiated rulemaking have indeed been realized."215
Yet the study conducted by Langbein and Kerwin does not
demonstrate that such benefits have been realized. The data
they report are at best evidence of the perceptions of partici
pants, not evidence of the underlying qualities that would make
for a better rule, such as efficiency or effectiveness. As Langbein
and Freeman state in their recent discussion of the Langbein and
Kerwin study, "[a]s to whether reg neg produces 'better rules' in
some objective sense, we cannot say."216
Before explaining why this is so, two other limitations of the
Langbein and Kerwin data should be noted. First, the types of
respondents in the negotiated rulemaking sample differ consider210

211
212
213
214
21s
216

Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 601.

Id. at 600-602.
Id. at 603-604.
Id. at 604 exhib.1.

See Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 55-56, 59 tbl.3.

Id. at 56.

Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 66.
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ably from the types of respondents in the conventional rulemak
ing sample. Langbein and Kerwin report that of all the types of
participants in negotiated rulemakings, the representatives from
EPA and state government gave negotiated rulemaking the high
est overall ratings.217 This is important to recognize because ap
proximately eleven percent of the negotiated rulemaking
participants they interviewed were EPA officials and approxi
mately twenty-five percent were representatives from state and
local government.218 In contrast, the sample of individuals who
filed comments in conventional rulemakings obviously included
no one from EPA219 and included only three representatives
from state and local government.220 Thus, approximately thirty
six percent of the respondents from negotiated rulemakings were
individuals who might be considered "enthusiasts," given their
higher overall ratings, while only approximately six percent of
the comparison group were.221 We should not be surprised, of
course, if government regulators tend to rate government regula
tions, whether negotiated or otherwise, more favorably than
those whom the regulations affect.222 In addition, we should also
not be surprised if those who help to craft a negotiated rule re
port more favorable ratings than those who file comments on a
proposed rule, since presumably people tend to file comments
when they have complaints they ,vish to air. Notably, only
211 Cornelius M. Kerwin & Laura I. Langbein, An Evaluation of Negotiated
Rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency: Phase II, A Comparison
of Conventional and Negotiated Rulemaking 45 tbl.46 (August 1997) [hereinaf
ter Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II] (unpublished report prepared for the EO\i
ronmental Protection Agency, on file with N. Y. U. Em•ironmelltal Lall' Journal);
see also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 61 n.5.
21s Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II, supra note 217, at 45 tbl.1.
219 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 620. The fact that EPA officials
would never be included in a sample derived from commenters is so obvious
that it is remarkable to find Langbein and Freeman now claiming that "partici
pants, including EPA, rate the outcomes of negotiated rules as better than the
outcomes from conventional rulemaking." Freeman & Langbein, supra note
133, at 66 (emphasis added). We cannot infer anything at all about how EPA
officials compare negotiated and conventional rulemaking from a study that
only asks their views of negotiated rulemaking. It may be relevant, however, to
consider that EPA has not commenced a new negotiated rulemaking proceed
ing since 1993.
220 Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II, supra note 217, at 45 tbl.1.
221 Id.
222 Cf. WE1ss, supra note 33, at 147 (noting that "[h]owever objective they
may be, staff members can be suspected of bias-often justly-in the direction of
seeing improvement where none exists").
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twenty-four percent 'of the negotiated rulemaking respondents
came from business, compared with sixty-seven percent of the
respondents in the conventional rulemaking sample. The differ
ences in the average ratings reported by Langbein and Kerwin,
and relied on by Harter, seem likely to reflect these differences
in the makeup of the samples.223
Second, although Langbein and Kerwin claim their data re
veal that participants in negotiated rulemakings have a "higher
level of satisfaction with the final rule,"224 one of the negotiated
rulemakings in their study-the hazardous waste manifest
223 Langbein and Kerwin purport to control for the affiliation of their respon
dents in their regression analysis. See Langebein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at
623-24. However, their model fails to provide a sufficient basis for ruling out
the effects of respondents' affiliation on the results that Harter cites. First,
Langbein and Kerwin only report having attempted to control for the effects of
affiliations on respondents' overall ratings of the rulemaking process, not on the
specific ratings of the substantive qualities of the rules (such as efficiency and
quality). Second, even with respect to the ratings for overall process, Langbein
and Kerwin fail to control meaningfully for the effects of respondents' affilia
tions. They control for the ratings provided by respondents from different affil
iations (e.g. business or environmental groups) relative to the ratings provided
by respondents from EPA. See id. at 622-23 exhibs.8&9. While ordinarily this
would be fine, using EPA as the reference group in this case is problematic
because Langbein and Kerwin have absolutely no EPA respondents in their
conventional rulemaking sample. Hence, the most that could possibly be said is
that Langbein and Kerwin have tested for how respondents from other affilia
tions, such as business and environmental groups, rate the process of both con
ventional and negotiated rules compared with the ratings EPA officials give just
to negotiated rules. To rule out the effects of affiliation using the approach they
take, Langbein and Kerwin would have needed to compare the ratings of non
EPA respondents in both types of rulemakings, with the ratings of EPA respon
dents in both types of rulemakings. As it stands, interpreting the results for the
affiliation variables in Langbein and Kerwin's statistical model is a lot like try
ing to compare apples and oranges. In statistical terms, the excluded dummy
variable in their model ("EPA") is essentially an interaction term, as all the
ratings provided by EPA are interacting with the independent variable of inter
est ("reg neg"). The excluded dummy variable is effectively at work only for
negotiated rules, not for conventional rules. Based on the available analysis
provided by Langbein and Kerwin, it is therefore not possible to rule out the
likelihood that the higher average ratings for negotiated rules that Harter
points to are at least partly a function of the substantial differences in the affili
ations of the respondents making up the two samples.
224 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 603. Langbein and Kerwin use the
term "final rule" numerous times in their study to describe their data, even
using it in their section heading on "Satisfaction with the Overall Process and
the Final Rule." Id. at 602. Langbein and Freeman similarly state that "partici
pants in negotiated rulemakings expressed greater satisfaction with the final
rule than participants in conventional rulemakings." Freeman & Langbein,
supra note 133, at 110.
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rulemaking-had not resulted in a final rule at the time of their
interviews.225 This is significant because nineteen respondents in
their study came from this one rulemaking, more than from any
other rulemaking in their study except the reformulated gasoline
rulemaking which had twenty respondents.226 As a result, nearly
twenty percent of the negotiated rulemaking respondents
(nineteen out of 101)227 in the Langbein and Kenvin study could
not express any meaningful satisfaction with the "eventual out
come (i.e., the final rule)" because EPA had simply not yet issued
any final rule on hazardous waste manifests.228 Langbein and
Kenvin nevertheless included responses from the participants in
the hazardous waste manifest negotiations in their analysis.229
Putting these concerns to the side, it is conceivable that an
appropriate comparison of participant perceptions of final rules
might still result in higher average ratings for negotiated rules
than for conventional rules. However, even if this were so, it
would not provide "powerful" support, as Harter suggests,230 for
his belief that negotiated rulemaking leads to better rules. On
the contrary, it would provide no reliable evidence at all for the
underlying quality of the rules. To see why, consider Langbein
and Kenvin's findings ,vith respect to litigation. They asked their
respondents to rate the likelihood that the rules for which they
were involved in the rulemaking process would resist legal chal
lenge. The average rating for negotiated rules (3.3) turned out to
be significantly higher than the average rating given for conven225 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 629. According to Langbein and
Kerwin, all of the other rules in their study had resulted in a final rule at the
time of the interviews. Id. at 600.
226 Kerwin & Langbein, Phase I, supra note 39, at 6.
'127 Id.
228 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 603. Kenvin boasts that his study
with Langbein provides "the most compelling evidence to date ••• that negoti
ated rulemaking produces ... results superior to conventional rulemaking."
CoRNELIUS M. KERWIN, RuLEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AoENCJES WRITE
LAw AND MAKE POLICY 182 (2d ed.1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter KER
WIN 2d]. Yet the results had yet to come in for about twenty percent of his
respondents in that study.
'129 The number of responses included in the average ratings reported by
Langbein and Kerwin range from ninety-five to ninety-nine for most of the cri
teria that they surveyed, indicating that they must have included responses from
the interviews ,vith the nineteen participants from the hazardous waste manifest
rule. See Langbein & Kenvin, supra note 89, at 604 exhib.1.
230 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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tional rules (1.9).231 Of course, this does not mean that negoti
ated rules really are more resistant to legal challenge. As we
have seen, the evidence from court filings shows otherwise: nego
tiated rules are challenged at a higher rate than conventional
rules.232 Along other dimensions, such as the average number of
petitions filed and the rate of settlement, negotiated rulemaking
exhibits no greater degree of resistance to litigation.233 It is pre
cisely this kind of data, not data on participants' perceptions, that
is needed to make judgments about the actual resistance of nego
tiated rules to legal challenge. Appropriately, Langbein and Ker
win acknowledge as much.234 Nowhere in their published article
do they discuss the statistically significant and more favorable
rating respondents give negotiated rules for their resistance to
legal challenge.235 Instead, they make a limited effort to report
the actual litigation rates for the rules included in their study.236
They admit "the limitations of the approach [they] used to deter
mine the occurrence and outcomes of litigation." 237 At best, they
claim that "although our data are not as comprehensive as Cog
lianese's, our evidence is consistent with his." 238
If participants in negotiated rulemakings tend to rate the re
sulting rules more favorably when it comes to litigation, they cer231 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 604 exhib.1. The ratings are on an
11-point scale, with a "5" indicating that the respondent believed the rule had
the most resistance to legal challenge possible and a "-5" indicating a belief that
the rule had the least resistance possible.
232 See supra tbl.2.
233 Id.
234 Kerwin describes his study with Langbein as dealing with the issue of liti
gation "in only cursory fashion." KERWIN 2d, supra note 228, at 182.
235 In Table 3 of his article, Harter excerpts the average ratings given for
resistance to litigation in the Langbein and Kerwin study, but, like Langbein
and Kerwin, he makes no mention of them in the text of his article. Langbein &
Kerwin, supra note 89, at 604 exhib.1, cited in Harter, Assessing the Assessors,
supra note 5, at 59 tbl.3.
236 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 614. Rather than consult court
records, Langbein and Kerwin rely on information provided by ACUS on some
of the challenges filed against negotiated rules and on simply asking their nego
tiated and conventional rulemaking respondents if they knew whether the rule
in which they were involved had been challenged. Id. In the many interviews I
have conducted with interest group lawyers and regulatory staff, I have often
noticed that otherwise knowledgeable policy insiders do not always know about
litigation challenging EPA rules, even for the rulemakings in which they have
been involved.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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tainly may do so when it comes to other qualities of rules.239
Participants' perceptions of certain aspects of a final rule do not
necessarily match reality. In fact, there are at least three well
accepted psychological explanations for why participants• per
ceptions would tend to be more favorable toward negotiated
rulemakings, none of which have anything to do with the under
lying quality of the rules. Cognitive dissonance, the Hawthorne
effect, and procedural justice theory all can lead one to ex-pect
that respondents would give higher ratings to negotiated
rulemaking.
Social psychologists have for many years told us that individ
uals adjust their views to avoid dissonance because the existence
of incompatible or dissonant cognitions is psychologically un
comfortable.240 One paradigmatic kind of cognitive dissonance,
the so-called "effort justification paradigm," occurs as individuals
respond to the effort needed to achieve an outcome.241 The
more effort an individual must expend at some task, and the
more unpleasant that effort, more dissonance is generated.242 In
dividuals who find themselves in such situations reduce disso
nance "by exaggerating the desirability of the outcome. "243 In
the classic study demonstrating this effect, women were asked to
undertake either a severe or a mild rite of "initiation., to join a
discussion group.244 Although the discussion group was equally
boring in either case, the women who were assigned to undertake
the more severe initiation evaluated the group more favorably
than did the women who went through the mild initiation.245 As
Elliot Aronson has explained, "going through hell and high water
to gain admission to a boring discussion group was dissonant with
239 Indeed, if Langbein and Kerwin's analysis of litigation is "cursory." as
Kerwin has acknowledged, see KERWIN 2d, supra note 228, at 182, it is hard to
see how the application of the same research methods to other criteria could
provide "the most compelling evidence to date that negotiated rulemaking pro
duces, on many fronts, results superior to conventional rulemaking," as Kerwin
has claimed. Id.
240 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF CoGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2-3 (1957).
241 Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An I11troductio11 to Cognitfre Disso
nance Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives Oil the Theory, in CoGNI•
TIVE DISSONANCE PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
3, 8 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds.• 1999).
242 Id. at 7.
243 Id.
244 Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effect of Severity of I11itiatio11 Oil Lik
ing for a Group, 59 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 177 (1959).
245 Id. at 180-81.
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one's self-concept as a smart and reasonable person, who makes
smart and reasonable decisions."246
Negotiated rulemaking is similarly an effort-intensive form
of rulemaking. Since participants in negotiated rulemaking ex
pend more effort (and complain more of the need to expend
more effort),247 we can expect that they will reduce their disso
nance by viewing the outcome of this intensive process more fa
vorably. What is striking from the Langbein and Kerwin study is
that they find no statistically significant differences between the
responses from the negotiated and the conventional rulemaking
samples with regard to perceived net benefits from participation
in the rulemaking process.248 The overwhelming majority of re
spondents in both groups found that the benefits they realized
from their participation equaled or exceeded the costs.249 When
the costs of participating in negotiated rulemaking are so much
higher, individuals can be expected to exaggerate the desirable
qualities of the outcome of the rulemaking process, holding this
net satisfaction level constant and avoiding cognitive dissonance.
A second explanation for higher ratings by negotiated
rulemaking participants may be found in the so-called Haw
thorne effect. This effect, named for the factory in which it was
first documented, refers to the artificial boost that occurs from
the mere participation in an experiment or study.250 Researchers
investigating the effects of changes in working conditions on pro
ductivity found that, over a period of more than two years, the
productivity of the experimental group always rose-regardless
of the changes made to the work schedule, lighting, methods of
pay, and other conditions under study.251 The workers in the ex
perimental group outperformed everyone else due to the high
level of morale they associated with being in an experiment and
because they knew they were being observed.252 Anyone who
studies the perceptions of participants in negotiated rulemaking
must be mindful that the Hawthorne effect may play a role be246 Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in CooNI•
supra note 241, at 103, 112.
247 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
248 Kerwin & Langbein, supra note 217, at 26, 45 tbl.38.
249 Id.
250 See F.J. Roethlisberger & William J. Dickson, Management and the
Worker (1939).
251 See id. at 75-89.
252 See id. at 85-86, 179-86.
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cause negotiated rulemaking is a novelty in the administrative
process and has often been treated as an experiment.253 Those
serving on a negotiated rulemaking may well be boosted in their
morale or satisfaction just from knowing that they are participat
ing in a special, experimental regulatory process. Philip Harter
has himself earlier acknowledged that the Hawthorne effect can
arise in cases of negotiated rulemaking.254
A final possible explanation for more favorable perceptions
of negotiated rules stems from the work of social psychologist
Tom Tyler and others on procedural justice.255 The procedural
justice literature supports the claim that how people value pro
cess independently of how they value outcomes.256 Langbein
and her coauthors favor this theory, arguing that negotiated
rulemaking fosters increased satisfaction, or a "warm glow," be
cause participants are treated with respect and have a greater op
portunity to provide their input.257 Of course, as already
suggested, such a "warm glow" may also come in this case from
cognitive dissonance, or perhaps from the Hawthorne effect,
rather than from considerations of procedural justice. Indeed, it
may well be that cognitive dissonance or the Hawthorne effect
provide the better:, explanation, if for no other reason than that it
is hard to see why negotiated rulemaking should be viewed as
more procedurally legitimate than a full, open rulemaking pro
cess. Langbein and Kerwin never asked their respondents to rate
the fairness of the rulemaking processes in which they partici
pated,258 although they did ask them to rate the extent to which
253 See, e.g., USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir.
1996) (describing negotiated rulemaking as a "novelty in the administrative
process"). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
254 Philip J. Harter, EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Will Proi•ide Opporlllnity
for Direct Participation in Development of a Regulation, 13 Envtl. L Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,202, 10,203 (July 1983) (noting the potential for "the intru
sion of the Hawthorne effect" in negotiated rulemaking).
255 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY or
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
256 See id. at 66-70.
257 Langbein&, Kerwin, supra note 89, at 626 (arguing that participants "care
about how the authorities who make and implement rules and policies treat
them (and others)"). See also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 67 (as
serting that "the data suggest that the legitimacy benefit turns, to a significant
extent, on participation in a process, specifically one that presents an opportu
nity to affect the outcome").
258 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 626 (noting that "we did not ask
respondents explicitly to rate the fairness of the rule-making process in which
they participated").
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public participation affected agency policy.259 As they write in
their Phase II report, "in both cases [of negotiated and conven
tional rulemaking], public participation is viewed as open, unbi
ased, and influential. The two rulemaking processes are seen as
equally receptive and responsive to public involvement." 260 If
Langbein and Kerwin are correct that these two processes are
equally responsive,261 then it would seem that researchers should
look beyond procedural justice theory for an explanation of the
"warm glow" allegedly fostered by negotiated rulemaking.
No matter which of these three theories best explains the
more favorable ratings that participants might give to their ex
periences with negotiated rulemaking, the main point is that such
perceptions do not provide a sound basis for drawing any infer
ences about the underlying efficacy and efficiency of regulations.
Harter is simply wrong to claim that the results of the Langbein
and Kerwin study show that negotiated rulemaking has suc
ceeded in achieving better rules.262
B. Alternative Forms of Rulemaking Offer Similar Advantages
Without the Disadvantages of Decision Making
by Consensus
Harter not only misinterprets and overstates the results of
the Langbein and Kerwin study, he also understates the
problems engendered by negotiated rulemaking and the effec
tiveness of alternative forms of public participation in the
rulemaking process. As a form of advocacy, it may be under
standable for Harter to downplay the problems associated with
negotiated rulemaking and to disregard the advantages of its al
ternatives. However, a complete assessment of negotiated
rulemaking needs to take into account both advantages and dis
advantages, and then to compare these against the performance
of alternative forms of public participation in the regulatory
process.
Although Harter does not acknowledge any problems with
negotiated rulemaking, consensus-based processes actually pre
sent several potential limitations on the development of sound
Id. at 612.
Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II, supra note 217, at 23-24.
Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 613-14 (noting that "the agency is
equally responsive to outside pressures in both rule making processes").
262 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 56.
259
260
261
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public policy.263 As explained earlier, negotiated rulemaking de
mands additional time and contributes new sources of conflict to
the policy process.264 But the potential hazards of policy making
by consensus run still deeper.
By emphasizing the attainment of consensus, negotiated
rulemaking tends to lead agencies to focus on more tractable is
sues, rather than the most important problems or those most de
serving of additional time and effort. That agencies select rules
based on tractability is evident in, if nothing else, the paucity of
rules that agencies have developed through negotiated rulemak
ing.265 Proponents of negotiated rulemaking have never claimed
that consensus building would be appropriate for much more
than about five to ten percent of all agency rulemakings,266 and
in practice the use of the procedure has been still more rare.2ti7
Agencies have eschewed negotiated rulemaking for federal rules
having the broadest and most substantial impacts on industry and
the public.268
An emphasis on consensus can lead not only to the selection
at the outset of the more tractable policy issues for negotiation,
but also to the selection of the more tractable issues within the
negotiations themselves, even though these may not necessarily
be the issues that are most important to the public. The fact that
the negotiated rulemaking committee is charged ,vith achieving
consensus may inhibit some participants from raising important
issues for fear of hindering the achievement of an agreement. In
263 For a more extensive discussion of the problems associated with decision
making by consensus, see Coglianese, Is Consensus Appropriate?. supra note 2,
at 106-13.
264 See supra Parts II, III.
265 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 1, at 44 (indicating that negoti
ated rulemaking "could be used to develop as much as ten percent of all rules");
Miller, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting EPA's Christopher Kirtz as stating that
"between 5% and 10% of our regulations lend themselves to the technique of
negotiated rulemaking").
267 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1277 {less than one
tenth of one percent of all federal rules have been promulgated following a
negotiated rulemaking proceeding).
268 Id. at 1318 (noting that "the EPA rules that affect the broadest number of
organizations have never been selected for negotiated rulemaking"). Only five
negotiated rulemakings have been classified as "major" or "significant" rules
for having economic effects of $100 million or more annually. Id. at 1314 n.266.
Moreover, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act sets forth principles that agencies
are supposed to use in selecting rules for negotiation, most of which place a
premium on tractability rather than on policy importance. lei. at 1319-20.
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this way, a quest for consensus may exacerbate the tendency for
"groupthink" to take hold.269 In the equipment leaks negotiated
rulemaking, for example, an EPA official knew industry was
overlooking issues related to an entire category of equipment in
developing the rule, but never said a word about it during the
negotiations.270 Only later, in the subsequent litigation over the
rule, did the industry group raise the issue of coverage of the
neglected equipment.271 In many circumstances decision makers
need conflict to help illuminate policy issues. The full articula
tion of opposing views, even structured in an adversarial process,
may yield more useful information on which to construct public
policy than a truncated discussion between individuals who are
striving to achieve consensus.272
In addition to giving priority to tractable issues, negotiated
rulemaking may encourage imprecision or ambiguity.273 Since it
is usually easier to achieve consensus at higher levels of abstrac
tion, the potential always exists that negotiators will adopt ab
stract or vague language.274 As Neil Kenvin has observed, when
an agency commits itself to obtaining consensus, that is, "to pro269 When policy decisions are based on consensus some participants "may
refrain from voicing their concerns, either by self-discipline and a desire not to
shatter group harmony (suppression of doubts) or following direct hints by the
leader (compliance) or by fellow group members (mindguards; peer pressure).
When consensus is no longer required, group discussion can be more open."
PAUL 'T HART, GROUPTIIINK IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS
AND POLICY FAILURE 293 (1994).
210 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1307-1308 n.246.
211 Id. at 1305.
212 Cf. RoGER B. PoRTER, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKINO: THE Eco.
NOMic PoLICY BoARD 21-29 (1980) (describing the advantages of a "multiple
advocacy" model of decision making, whereby presidential advisors are en
couraged to put forward competing positions as a means to achieve better in
formed policy).
273 See, e.g., JANE MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 167
(1980). In her study of democratic decision making, Jane Mansbridge found
that "[c]onsensual decision making also generates imprecision. In order to
reach unanimous agreement, groups formulate their collective decision so as to
blur potential disagreements." Id. This was demonstrated most clearly in re
cent years when former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus convened a
set of negotiations between industry, government, and the environmental com
munity to forge a consensus about how to improve environmental policy in the
United States. The resulting agreement consisted largely of vague statements
and platitudes. See Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Consensus, ENVIRONMENT,
Apr. 1999, at 28.
274 See Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65, 75 (1983).
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ducing a rule with which everyone with a recognized interest can
agree, the only way to break certain deadlocks is to produce a
rule that ignores unresolved (or unresolvable) issues or deals
with them through vague language whose meaning will be dis
puted during the implementation process."275 Adopting vague
language may serve to secure agreement for its own sake, but
doing so can constrain the effectiveness of any resulting public
policy.
Negotiated rulemaking's emphasis on unanimity also makes
it more likely that the final outcome will succumb to the lowest
common-denominator problem. The outcome that is minimally
acceptable to all the members of a negotiated rulemaking com
mittee will not necessarily be optimal or effective in terms of
achieving social goals. A recent study of negotiated rulemaking
conducted by Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford shows that
in industries that are not likely to innovate in the absence of
strong governmental regulation, the lowest-common-denomina
tor problem keeps negotiated rules from promoting the techno
logical innovation needed to improve environmental and safety
performance.276 They conclude that because industry represent
atives in these types of industries will be reluctant to agree to
regulations that would compel firms to make dramatic invest
ments in new technologies, "negotiated rulemaking's focus on
consensus can effectively Lremove the potential to spur
innovation."277
Although these problems do not necessarily arise in every
negotiated rulemaking, and some can surely occur even in certain
conventional rulemakings, a complete assessment of negotiated
rulemaking needs to take these potential hazards into account.
The incentives created by a search for consensus tend to make
these problems particularly more acute in regulatory negotia
tions. Moreover, a complete assessment of negotiated rulemak
ing and the quality of regulatory policy must compare negotiated
rulemaking with alternative forms of policy deliberation that do
not aim for unanimity. Although advocates of negotiated
rulemaking claim otherwise, it is possible to achieve many of the
2d, supra note 228, at 109.
Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of
Developing and Implementing Environmelltal and Occupational Health and
Safety Policy, 23 HAR.v. ENVIL L. REv. 141 {1999).
211 Id. at 201.
275 KERWIN

276
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asserted advantages of negotiated rulemaking by expanding par
ticipation in the conventional rulemaking process, all without
creating the perverse incentives that can arise when policymakers
seek consensus.
The choice for agencies is not between developing rules
through negotiated rulemaking or developing rules inside a
closet. Agencies can, and regularly do, engage the interests af
fected by rules through individual and collective forms of dia
logue.278 These alternative forms of deliberation, be they
individual meetings, public workshops, or formal advisory com
mittees, provide the agency with the same kinds of opportunities
for public input into regulatory decision making as negotiated
rulemaking.279 But they also avoid creating pressures to empha
size tractability, accept ambiguity, or descend to the lowest com
mon denominator. After all, it is the deliberation-not the
consensus-that generates the information that enables agencies
to craft their policy decisions. To the extent that public officials
already employ participatory processes that enable interested
parties to share information, these alternative forums for deliber
ation within the conventional rulemaking process can provide
comparable, if not superior, results.
Harter and other proponents of negotiated rulemaking
question whether anything short of negotiated rulemaking will
do.280 Harter specifically lauds the averaging approach EPA
adopted in its reformulated gasoline regulation as a key innova278 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2, at 1330-31.
279 In their Phase II report, Langbein and Kerwin indicate that their respon
dents view the EPA as equally responsive to public input during the conven•
tional rulemaking process:
Conventional rulemaking respondents view EPA as open to their ideas
and the rules the Agency produces as heavily influenced by the public
participation that does occur. While negotiated rulemaking may offer
slightly greater benefits in terms of the efficacy of public participation,
they are properly viewed at best as incremental given the solid base of
public involvement that appears to have been established by EPA's over
all approach to rulemaking.
Kerwin & Langbein, Phase II, supra note 217, at 24.
280 See, e.g., Harter, Fear of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1410-11, 1418-19
(arguing that consultative processes other than negotiated rulemaking fail to
achieve as many benefits); Freeman & Langbein, supra note 133, at 64, 134
(expressing doubt that policy deliberations short of negotiated rulemaking will
work as effectively). See also KERWIN 2d, supra note 228, at 183 (observing
that "advocates of negotiated rulemaking are skeptical of partial substitutes and
decry the loss of commitment that goes with them"). Although advocates con•
tinue to claim that nothing short of negotiated rulemaking will work effectively,
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tion that was discovered only because the rule was negotiated.281
Under the averaging approach, refiners could meet fuel stan
dards based on the average applied over entire stocks of fuel re
fined during the calendar year rather than applied on a per
gallon basis.282 In return for the additional flexibility that this
averaging approach provided to refiners, the final rule required
refiners to meet a standard that wa:; somewhat more stringent,
thus satisfying environmentalists' concerns.283 Harter argues that
no research has yet systematically to compare negotiated rulemaking with other
intensive but non-consensual efforts at public deliberation.
281 See Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 50 (asserting that
"[t]he fact that the rule had been negotiated ... resulted in a much better
rule"). For the text of the reformulated gasoline rule, see Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives; Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59
Fed. Reg. 7716 (Feb. 16, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 80). Ed Weber
calls the effort leading to the promulgation of the reformulated gasoline rule a
"new model for regulation that can achieve more effecli\'e environmental r.!
sults at lower costs than associated with the adversarial approach." Edward P.
Weber, Successful Collaboration: Negotiatil1g Effectfre Regulations, Esvmo:,:.
MENT, Nov. 1998, at 10, 11. In reality EPA's reformulated gasoline rule has
been one of EPA's most problematic regulations in recent years. Not only did
the rule result in several administrative and legal challenges, it also generated
exceptional outcry in the press and led to the first \VfO decision striking down
a U.S. regulation. See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 2 al 1292;
World 'Irade Organization, Doc. No. \Vf/DS2R, reprimed i11 World Trade Or
ganization: Report of Panel in United States-Standards for Gasoline, 35 I.LM.
274, 279-91 (1996). In addition, the fuel additive authorized by the rule, MTBE,
has generated enormous controversy as it may be a carcinogen. The possibility
that MTBE may enter drinking water if leaked into groundwater in various
parts of the country has prompted efforts to ban the future use of the additi\'e.
See, e.g., Marla Cone, EPA to Ban Gas Additfre Natio11ll'ide, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2000, at A3; Marla Cone, EliJ11inatio11 ofAdditive from Gas is Ordered, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at A3. See also Judith Newman, 1kenty of the Greatest
Blunders in Science in the Last 1ive11ty Years, D1scovER, Oct. 2000, al 78, 83.
At the same time that Harter claims that certain purportedly beneficial aspects
of the rule ought to be attributed to negotiated rulemaking, he also disavows
any connection between negotiated rulemaking and the problems of the rule.
See Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 5, at 50. Howe\'er, it is certainly
plausible that a more adversarial process could have resulted in a more mean
ingful airing up front of concerns about MTBE and the impact of the rule on
foreign refiners, and that the EPA might well have been more recepti\'e to these
concerns. Nevertheless, even if Harter were correct that negotiated rulemaking
did not cause the problems with the reformulated gasoline rule, neither did it
prevent them. Regulatory negotiation did not cure the malaise in this
rulemaking.
282 Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. at
7721, 7724, 7753-54, 7756-57.
283 Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. al
7721. See also Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 57 Fed.
Reg. 13,416, 13,425 (Apr. 16, 1992) (supplemental notice of proposed rulemak-
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this averaging provision, combined with the somewhat more
stringent standard, was a significant innovation that EPA would
not have developed had it not been engaged in a negotiated
rulemaking.284
EPA officials, though, did not need negotiated rulemaking in
order to conceive and adopt such an averaging plan. EPA had
already adopted high-profile emissions trading policies more
than a decade before the reformulated gasoline rule, all of which
rely on averaging, but none of which grew out of negotiated
rulemakings.285 More specifically, EPA's fuel standards relied on
averaging approaches since at least the 1970s, and averaging was
integral to the EPA's program for phasing out leaded gasoline in
the 1980s.286 Moreover, regulators at EPA hardly needed formal
negotiations to tell them that environmental groups would more
readily support an averaging approach if it was accompanied by
more stringent standards. Indeed, EPA had made the same kind
of trade-off in allowing emissions trading and banking for heavy
duty diesel engines, with a corresponding twenty percent reduc
tion in standards, four years before its reformulated gasoline

ing) (describing the more stringent standards for averaging with the per- gallon
standards).
284 Harter first advanced this argument in remarks delivered at a panel or
ganized around my research at the Association of American Law Schools meet
ing on January 9, 1998. See supra note 85. He repeats in his recent article
essentially the same claims about the averaging component of the reformulated
gasoline rule which he made at the AALS meeting. Harter, Assessing the Asses
sors, supra note 5, at 50 n.96 (asserting that the eventual rule resulted in lower
standards and greater flexibility "than would have emerged from a traditional
rulemaking").
285 For a review of _emissions trading and other market-based policies, see
Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regula
tion: A New Era From an Old Idea, 18 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1 {1991). Administrative
lawyers will be quite familiar with emissions averaging, as such an approach
undergirded the EPA's emissions trading rule which was challenged in Chevron,
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reh'g
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 {1984).
286 Robert Hahn & Gordon Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 EcoLOGY L. Q. 374 {1989) (describing lead-trading rule's pro
visions allowing refiners to add more lead to gasoline during certain parts of the
year and less in others in order to arrive at a lead level consistent with their
yearly allowable permits). See also Standards for Reformulated and Conven
tional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7768 {"Lead phasedown was similar to refor
mulated gasoline in that refiners and importers were required to meet an
average standard that applied to gasoline produced or imported.").
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rulemaking.287 In all of these earlier cases, EPA officials devel
oped the same kind of innovation Harter attributes to negotiated
rulemaking, but they did so using conventional rulemaking
procedures.
The more widely used forms of public participation in con
ventional rulemaking offer regulators the same opportunity to in
corporate the knowledge and practical experience of the public
into regulatory decisions-an opportunity that advocates claim
uniquely for negotiated rulemaking. However, using these alter
native forms of public participation in conventional rulemaking
can improve regulatory policy while minimizing the problems
that arise when consensus becomes the goal for regulatory policy,
as occurs in negotiated rulemaking. The validity of my conclu
sion in Assessing Consensus remains undiminished: in the ab
sence of negotiated rulemaking's promised benefits, "agencies•
continued reliance on public participation methods which do not
depend on consensus would appear the more sensible approach
to making regulatory decisions. "288
CONCLUSION

For years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have put
forth enthusiastic promises about how negotiated rulemaking
would reduce litigation and shorten the rulemaking process.
Philip Harter, in his recent article purporting to assess my empir
ical study, has continued this line of advocacy for negotiated
rulemaking. He advances a series of criticisms of my research
but, as I have explained in this Article, he is simply wrong about
each of them and about each of the claims he makes in his de
fense of negotiated rulemaking. His continued efforts to make a
case for negotiated rulemaking fail to adhere to the most rudi
mentary principles of sound empirical analysis, including the use
of clear criteria, consistency in applying these criteria to both
treatment and comparison groups, and the inclusion of negative
as well as positive cases in an empirical evaluation. In effect,
Harter puts a thumb down on the side of the scale that favors
negotiated rulemaking, offering a perhaps predictable plea of adw See Certification Programs for Banking & Trading of Oxides of Nitrogen
& Particulate Emission Credits for Heavy Duty Engines, 55 Fed. Reg. 30.584,
30,585 (July 26, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 86).
288 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 5, at 1336.
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vocacy but not any credible new assessment of negotiated
rulemaking.
Despite nearly twenty years of experimentation, negotiated
rulemaking has yet to achieve a demonstrable reduction in the
time it takes to develop regulations nor in the frequency or inten
sity of subsequent litigation over those regulations. Indeed, the
empirical record shows that negotiated rulemaking actually de
mands more effort and results in more litigation than other com
parable rulemaking processes. Had it not been for several
decades worth of enthusiastic advocacy of negotiated rulemak
ing, these results would probably neither be surprising nor con
tested. After all, it is bound to take an intensive effort to
develop a consensus among multiple interests on a proposed
rule, even for those rules that agencies find more predisposed to
success and which are for that reason selected for negotiation in
the first place. It is similarly unrealistic to expect that negotia
tion will stave off subsequent litigation, especially when negoti
ated processes themselves raise expectations and generate
conflicts over who participates in the negotiation and over what
the terms (and silences) in the negotiated agreements mean.
The finding that negotiated rulemaking neither reduces
rulemaking time nor prevents litigation could conceivably be
viewed as somewhat less of a failure if it could be shown that
negotiated rulemaking systematically led to significantly better
quality rules. Harter makes such an assertion, but it too is unsup
ported by the available body of empirical research. The results
of the Langbein and Kerwin study cited by Harter are not easy to
interpret, but at best they can be said to show only that partici
pants in negotiated rulemakings tend to perceive the conven
tional rulemaking process in terms better than those who file
comments perceive the conventional rulemaking process. Per
ceptions on the part of participants in negotiated rulemaking,
formed as they are after involvement in quite intensive processes,
are likely explained by factors other than genuine, underlying
policy improvements. Indeed, there are good reasons to doubt
that negotiated rulemaking will in fact lead to any systematic im
provement at all in regulatory policy. Making consensus a pre
condition for policymaking will only likely exacerbate problems
such as ambiguity, lowest common denominator results, and an
undue emphasis on tractability. More significantly, whatever
benefits negotiated rulemaking might presumably hold in terms
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of generating information and dialogue over regulatory policy,
these benefits appear to be just as achievable through alternative
processes that encourage public participation but which do not
demand consensus. Negotiated rulemaking's failure to achieve
its goals of reducing rulemaking time and preventing litigation is
simply not offset by any demonstrated improvements in the qual
ity of regulatory policy when compared with other ways of devel
oping regulations.
Given that the promises made for negotiated rulemaking
over the years remain unfulfilled, agency officials seeking to in
volve the public in the rulemaking process should continue to
rely on other processes for developing regulations. Negotiated
rulemaking demands a concentrated investment of time and re
sources by all involved, but without any clear corresponding re
turn in terms of avoiding litigation or achieving other goals.
Nothing in Harter's latest effort to salvage negotiated rulemak
ing diminishes this conclusion. Agency officials, legislators, and
other observers of the regulatory process would do well to look
elsewhere for a cure to whatever ills the regulatory process.

